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The Collateral Source Rule and
Personal Injury Damages: The
Irrelevant Principle and the
Functional Approach
by

ROBERT ALLEN SEDLE_*

PART I**

Damages law is often thought of as static and uninteresting.
It is part of the "minutiae"' that makes up the law of remedies.
Notwithstanding that every litigated case involves a potential
question of remedies, 2 most frequently damages, this area of the

law plods its way, ignored by the academicians 3 and "accepted"
by the courts. The "winds of change" sweeping over other areas
of law rarely stir the law of damages. There are a few ripples
here and there, to be sure, 4 but no one gets too excited. Our
interest stops when questions of liability have been determined.
An exception is damages for personal injuries, perhaps because

suits for personal injuries comprise the great majority of litigated
cases. But here too, there is little academic interest in the

question of damages. The real debate revolves around the suitability of the existing system of fault based on negligence to
deal with the problem of automobile accidents and the matter
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, BA., 1956, J.D.,
1959, University of Pittsburgh.
**Editor's Note: In view of the necessarily unusual length of this article, it
is being published in two parts. Part H will appear in the next issue of the
Kentucky Law Journal (Vol. 58, No. 2).
1 C. Wrucirr, Preface to CAsES ON REMEDms (1955).

2 See Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 17 U. Dsr. L.J.
376 (1955).
3
It may be significant that the most current text on the subject is C.
McCoaMIcx, DAMAGES (1935).
4 Professor Harris is trying to create this with respect to seller's damages.

See e.g., Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages, 34 FoRD.
L. REv. 23 (1965); 18 STAN. L. REv. 66 (1965); 61 MicH. L. RIxv. 849 (1963).
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of enterprise liability.5 The bulk of the writing about damages
will be found in the "trade journals" published by the compensation and defense bar. There is a gap between the practitioner's
concept of what is important and the academician's, or perhaps
the academician's concept of what is interesting.

And so it has been with the venerable collateral source rule,
which has received at least some academic commentary." When
the New York Court of Appeals, which had been one of the few

courts that refused to give the rule unqualified acceptance, reaffirmed its position in 1962, it appeared that the rule might
again be subject to attack. However, any direct attack has

fizzled, and the position of the New York court was not followed

7
by other courts when faced with the identical fact situation.
All the while a "silent revolution" has been taking place in the
practice. Defense counsel have stopped mounting a direct attack
on the rule and have been resorting to a "flanking movement"
to get evidence of benefits from a "collateral source" before the
jury. As we will see, this evidence may have the same "dynamite

potentiar' as was once attributed to the mention of liability
insurance. Today, the number and variety of collateral source
benefits are increasing, particularly as regards social insurance.

And despite the proposals for statutory solutions to the accident
problem, it is likely our present law of tort liability will remain
the primary "legal" solution for some time to come.8 For these
5 See e.g., Blum and Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. Bnv. 641 (1964); Calabresi,
Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J.
261 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YAr. L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HAv. L. REv. 713 (1965); Keeton,
Conditional Faultin the Law of Torts, 72 HAv. L. BEv. 401 (1959); Keeton and
O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile Claims, 78
HAuv. L.REv. 329 (1965).
oMaxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 MIN. L. RBv. 669 (1962); Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B. U. L.
REv. 348 (1961). Another study from the academic perspective is West, The
Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16 Ox.A. L. 1Ev.
395 (1963).
7 The New York case, to be discussed subsequently, was Coyne v. Campbell,
11 N.Y.2d 386, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962). C.f. Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202,
173 N.E.2d 777 (1961). Contra, are Nelson v. Federal Mogul Service, 27 Pa.
D. &8C.2d 222 (1962); Odde v. Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 (R.I. 1966).
However, because of the availability of collateral source benefits, many
victims will receive some compensation. As to the adequacy of compensation
from "legal" and "non-legal" sources, see e.g., Morris and Paul, The Financial
Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. BEv. 913 (1962).
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reasons, a further exploration of the collateral source rule may
be justified.
Tim

COLLATERAL SOURCE RUiLE AND

Tm

SILENT REVOLTION

The collateral source rule, stated simply, is that the receipt
of benefits or mitigation of loss from sources other than the
defendant will not operate to diminish the plaintiff's recovery
of damages. One way of putting it is that "The defendant will
not be permitted to establish that the plaintiff did not actually
sustain the amount of injury alleged, if diminution resulted from
the conduct of a third person."' It is also possible to analyze
the rule as an exception to the principle that benefits to the
injured party resulting from the wrongful act are to be credited
to the defendant. There is said to be a "judicial refusal to credit
to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services received in
reparation of the injury which emanated from sources other
than the wrongdoer."10 If A runs B down with his automobile,
but takes him to the hospital and pays the bill, B cannot recover
the cost of the hospital bill in a suit for damages against A. Since
A paid the bill, he conferred a benefit on B, which is credited
against B's judgment. Whereas if C pays B's hospital bills, this
does not operate to reduce B's recovery against A, since C is a
"collateral source."" And so this has been the traditional view
in the American law of damages.'2 Although the doctrine is
occasionally involved in other kinds of cases," its primary significance is in the personal injury action, and we will discuss it
in that context.
The reasons for the rule are not difficult to understand when
we consider the social and economic milieu existing at the time
that the law of personal injury damages developed. The significant period of development, of course, was the latter part of
9

Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages, 77 Hav. L. Rzv. 741 (1964).
10 Maxwell, supra note 6, at 670-71.
"1As we will see, where the government is at the same time the tortfeasor

and the payor of the benefit,
as A and qua payor as C.

some

courts have seen the government

qua tortfeasor

12 See the discussion of the distinction between payments by a tortfeasor and
payments by a third party in C. McCoamac, supra note 3, at 324-25.
13 Genprallv regarding insurance proceeds, see the discussion in Maxwell, supra
note 6, at 672-79.
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the nineteenth century, when many suits were brought by
victims of the accidents that flowed from the process of industrialization. This was the period when concepts of laissez faire,
rugged individualism, and private initiative were deeply ingrained in our value structure. People paid their medical bills
out of private funds or savings, or a member of the family paid
for them. Recovery of such sums from the defendant was justified as recovery for "out-of-pocket" loss, and this phrase was
accurate. Those who were unable to pay were treated in the
"poor ward" of a hospital or at a "charity" hospital, where such
existed. By the same token, a person worked for his wages.
When he was injured or disabled, this meant that he lost time
from work or was unable to work again, and the concept of
recovery for "time lost" or "impairment of future earning opportunity" was realistic. There were no Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, health and accident insurance, sick leave, Worknen's
Compensation, and other "collateral sources" which would assist
the victim or his family in meeting some or all of the loss. 14
So too, it was quite realistic to think of the defendant as a
"wrongdoer." He would be held liable only if found to be
negligent under the rather strict concepts of negligence that
existed at that time, and if the plaintiff was not barred by his
own contributory negligence, assumption of risk, the fellowservant rule, or one of the other liability-limiting devices developed by the courts to protect the new industrial enterprises.1 5
Furthermore, liability insurance, as we now know it, was not
generally available.' 6 This being so, and in light of the prevailing
social and economic attitudes of that time, where a benefit was
received from a collateral source, it seemed perfectly proper that
the plaintiff rather than the wrongdoer should be the beneficiary.
It was accurate to say that the donor's intention was to benefit
the victim and not the wrongdoer. Poor wards and charity
hospitals were society's way of taking care of those who could
14 For the view that such benefits generally do not meet all the tangible loss
in cases of serious injury, see Morris and Paul, supra note 8, at 919-20.
15 The concern of the courts with limiting the liability of the new enterprises
is reflected in decisions such as Beattv v. Central Iowa Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W.
332 (1882); Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, [18561 11 Excheq. 781; Winterbottom v. Wright, [1842] 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
16 Dean Prosser suggests that liability insurance developed first as a means of
indemnifying employers, particularly as to liability under the early Workmen's
Compensation acts. W. Peossim, TonTs 563 (3rd ed., 1964).
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not pay for medical care, and a wrongdoer should not reap the
windfall. If the employer would give the plaintiff his wages
despite his incapacity, surely this act of generosity should not
result in reduced recovery for the object of the benevolence.1r
Of course, the social and economic setting has changed
radically. Liability insurance has long been available not only
to enterprises, but to potential individual defendants, so that
losses are no longer shifted, but distributed through insurance
or in the case of an uninsured enterprise, among the users of
the enterprise's product or services. Insurance is also available
to potential victims to cover medical expenses, loss of income
and the like, and to even make specified payments in case of
contingency. Social insurance, which in America usually takes
a form analogous to private insurance, has also become more
prevalent. Social insurance would include Workmen's Compensation, unemployment compensation, social security, and a
variety of other governmental-controlled benefits. Not only does
the individual defendant or enterprise not have to bear the loss,
but the accident victim himself might receive benefits through
private or social insurance.
What is interesting is that the changed economic and social
setting did not have any effect on the collateral source rule.
Although the rule originated during a much different period of
development, the courts have almost uniformly continued to
apply it to "benefits" which were unknown at the time of its
origin. Whenever a benefit can be classified as "collateral", the
trend is to extend the application of the rule so that the receipt
of the benefit does not affect tort rcovery.'8
We may also consider the method by which recovery for
personal injuries is determined. In the United States practically
all personal injury actions are tried before a jury. In theory, if
the plaintiff proves liability the jury will then award him full
recovery for all the damages he has suffered and proved to their
satisfaction. The award of damages will not be affected by any
doubts as to the defendant's liability. If the jury finds that the
defendant is not liable, it will award the plaintiff nothing, no
1178 Contra, Drinkwater

v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
The change in "systems of reparation" is effectively summarized in CoNRAD,

MoRGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ and BOmmAUGH, AuTromonIIE ACCIDENT CosTs AND
PAYMENTS, Ch. 1 (1964).
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matter how much damage it finds that he has suffered. It will
consider each category of damages: so much for medical expenses, past and future; so much for time lost from work prior
to the accident; so much for impairment of future earning
capacity; so much for pain and suffering.'9 The final verdict represents the sum total of these components.
Of course, we all know that this is not what happens, and
perhaps this is not what we want to happen. In most states
the jury returns a general verdict in which it resolves liability
and damages, and if it finds liability, it assesses damages in a
lump sum. If we expect the jury to perform as it is supposed to
do in theory, it may be asked why the jury does not first hear
all the evidence relating to liability, render a decision, and then
hear the evidence relating to damages. 20 So too, it may be
asked why the jury is not required to itemize its verdict,
indicating how much it awarded for each item of damage
claimed. Every trial lawyer knows that the jury does not separate
the question of damages from the question of liability and that
the more appealing the case from the standpoint of damages,
the more likely the jury is to award some recovery. The tendency of the jury to apply a "rough and ready" standard of
comparative negligence in cases it feels are appropriate is equally
notorious. The fact that the jury usually does pass on the
plaintiff's contributory negligence-and we may note the tendency of courts to leave the question to the jury2 -enables us
to avoid making a decision as to the desirability of a comparative negligence approach.22 The judge solemnly instructs
that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is to be a complete
bar, and we then rely on the jury as the "conscience of the community" to decide whether it should be so in the particular case.
Furthermore, if Professor Kalven and his colleagues in the
jury study project are correct, 23 the jury does not compute dam19

Here, of course, no problem of collateral source benefits is presented.
20 Some states have now adopted the "split-verdict" procedure in criminal
cases where the jury is to assess the penalty. See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1
(West 1959).
21 See the discussion in W. PRossER, supra note 16, at 430, 444.
22 To the extent that courts are extending the "last clear chance" doctrine,
the opportunity for the jury to apply its version of comparative negligence is
increased.
23
Three volumes have appeared to date, but the one on the civil jury has
(Continued on next page)
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ages by ascertaining a series of component sums. Instead it
takes a "gestalt approach," putting a price tag on the particular

injury. The person who lost both legs, but made a rapid recovery
and returned to work with two artificial legs, incurring only a
few thousand dollars in "specials," will, nonetheless, receive a
substantial verdict. 24 The jury may conceive of this as involving
pain and suffering,25 but it is equally probable that they are

awarding damages for the "loss of humanity," and it is doubtful
if the final amount would be much different if the plaintiff's
"specials" were substantial.2 6 So too, the jury will award substantial damages for the death of "non-productive" persons such
as retired people and young children;27 the study indicated

that many jurors feel that any human life must be worth at
least $5000.28

It is not only the institution of the jury that impels me to
call our system of awarding damages for personal injuries "crude
and inefficient." There is little difficulty measuring past medical

expenses or loss of wages where the plaintiff is a wage-earner,
and such damages are often stipulated. But the court, as well
as the jury, will have much more trouble in trying to estimate
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

not. The references to the findings of the jury study project are to Kaven, The
Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158
(1958).
24 This is the case of McNulty v. Southern Pacific Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 841,
216 P.2d 543 (1950).
25 M. BEmLi, THE MonE ADEQUATE Aw~Ai 24 (1952).
26 See the discussion in Kalven, supra note 23, at 170. However, I would
think that where the tangible loss was more significant and the injury was not
such that the tangible loss would be "swallowed up" in the loss of humanitv, the
size of the verdict would be affected by the evidence of tangible loss. This factor
becomes significant when we consider the kind of data the jury can "absorb".
271 do not include housewives in this category, for it is now recognized that
damages for the loss of services or wrongful death of a married woman can be
"quantified". See Lambert, How Much Is a Good Wife Worth, 41 B. U. L. REgv.
328 (1961). Courts will sometimes strain to uphold the jury's verdict in the
case of non-productive persons. See e.g., Durkeep v. Mishler, 233 Ore. 243, 378
P.2d 267 (1963) (in action for wrongful death of 77 year old retiree, jury could
consider the value of his services in caring for the wife through maintenance of
the home). This does not always happen. See e.g., Herbertson v. Russell, 150
Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962) (verdict of $25,000 for death of six year old girl
wa,; excessive, where family had little annual income, there were nine surviving
children, and the four oldest girls had married in their teens, contributing little, if
anything, to the parents' support). For an attempt to "quantify" damages for the
wrongful death of a child, see Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d
118 (1960). Some courts are now coming around to realizing that what is really
involved is the loss of society and companionship and are instructing the jury to
award damages on that basis. See Currie v. Fitting 375 Mich. 440. 134 N.E.2d
611 2(1965);
Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
8
Kalven, supra note 23, at 162.
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future medical expenses or the value of the lost time of a
plaintiff who was unemployed 29 or who was self-employed in an
enterprise involving capital investment. 30 A determination of
impairment of future earning capacity is even more complicated.
This involves predictions as to whether the injury will worsen,
what kind of work the plaintiff can do, what kind of work will
be available, and the like, plus a guess as to his life expectancy.
And I have not even mentioned the damages for pain and suffering. When the presence of the jury is added to all this, the
picture is even more complex. Do we permit the lay jury to
have access to mortality and annuity tables?31 Will they be
32
permitted to consider tax aspects and the inflationary spiral?
Can they accurately reduce recovery of loss of future earnings
and the award in a death case to present worth? And, as we
have pointed out, they do not separate the issue of liability
from the issue of damages, and probably do not divide the award
into its component parts. However, while the system is "more
crude and inefficient" because of the jury, it must be remembered
that the very method of measuring loss is in no sense scientific.
The plaintiff must recover all damages, past and prospective,
in a single action, and we are making no more than a guessonly to some extent, an educated guess-as to what they are.
It is in the context of this system that we will be considering
the collateral source rule. This needs a word of explanation.
Because of the prevalence of collateral source benefits, it is
unrealistic to think of tort liability as the only way of shifting
or redistributing the loss resulting from accidents. In fact,
surveys have concluded that close to half of the compensation
received by accident victims comes from sources other than
tort liability settlements or judgments.33 Professor Fleming has
proposed that the collateral source rule be reconsidered from
29

See e.g., Smith v. Triplett, 83 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).

30 See e.g., Dempsey v. City of Scranton, 264 Pa. 495, 107 A. 877 (1919).

31 See e.g., Littman v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 315 Pa. 370, 172 A. 687
(1934).
32

Compare McWeeney v. N.Y., N.H. & H fy. Co., 282 F.2d
34 (2d Cir.

1960), with Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). See
also Hall v. Chicago &N.W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
33 See the discussion in Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAIn. L. P1v. 1478, 1481-82 (1966). The most comprehensive study is CoNnA, MoiiGAn, PRA-t, VuLTz, and BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE
ACCmENT CosTs AND PAYmENTS (1964).
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this perspective.3 4 Rather than permit the victim to "cumulate

benefits," it would be decided whether accident losses generally
or a particular loss should be absorbed by the tortfeasor or a
collateral source, that is, whether the loss would be dealt with
by tort law or by private or social insurance.3 5 He concludes:
"It may be that tort liability will become only an excess or a
guarantee liability, its function being merely to allot responsibility
for compensation to a person (labelled tortfeasor) to the extent

that the cost of compensation has not been met by another
source."

36

Professor Fleming makes his point very persuasively. Clearly
tort liability is no longer the sole point of reference in determining

how particular accident losses should be absorbed. However,
I do not think-nor do I think that Professor Fleming is advocat-

ing-that an attempt at a different method of loss allocation
should be made within the framework of the present system.

We should not be thinking of how to reallocate loss until we
have dealt with the more fundamental question of providing

adequate compensation to victims of accidents in all cases. This
we do not now do. Our present system is based on what has
been called vertical splitting, under which "deserving victims"

obtain full recovery and "undeserving victims" obtain nothing
(unless from a collateral source); this is considered superior to

horizontal splitting, under which all victims, "deserving" and
"undeserving" obtain something.3 7 So long as the present system

is retained, I question the utility of dealing with the secondary
question of loss reallocation.
Moreover, it seems to me that any attempt at comprehensive

reallocation,3 8 under our present system of loss-allocation, which
34

Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
L. REv. 1478, 1481-82 (1966).
He lists the following criteria as significant: (1) the reprehensiveness of
the defendants conduct; (2) the desirability of attributing the cost to the losscausing enterprise for reasons of accident-prevention, proper cost allocation, etc.;
and (3) the function and the economic base of the particular collateral compensation regime. Id. at 1546.
36 Id.at 1549.
3
7Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 672.
88
This could be accomplished in the following ways: conferring on the
collateral source a right to indemnification, by either subrogation, assignment or
an independent claim against the tortfeasor; requiring the beneficiary to return
the benefit to the collateral source; in the case of continuing benefits, such as
periodic payments, by terminating the benefits after tort damages are recovered.
Fleming, supra note 33, at 1485. We will to some extent discuss loss reallocation
in connection with social insurance.
CALF.
35
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so far as the legal system is concerned is based on tort recovery,
requires the kind of empirical data that cannot be developed
in the context of litigation. A most important question, for
example, is whether it is worth the cost to redistribute a loss
once placed in efficient channels of distribution.39 The answer
may depend on the sources involved: perhaps there may be a
sufficient number of accident victims obtaining medical care at
a Veterans Administration Hospital so that the Veterans Administration would wish to recover the cost from the tortfeasor,
but there may be so few people receiving Social Security disability pensions due to accidents in which there is third party
liability that the Social Security Administration is not interested
in indemnification from the tortfeasor. Obviously, these kinds of
decisions cannot be made by courts in the context of deciding
a litigated case. It is only when we have addressed ourselves
to the primary question of comprehensive compensation for the
accident victim that we should consider comprehensive reallocation of losses between tortfeasors and collateral sources.
My guess is that the present system of vertical rather than
horizontal splitting will remain with us for some time.4" So far
as the law is concerned, the primary source of loss-shifting in
accident cases will be the enterprise or insured individual held
responsible for the harm under the fault principle. We will
continue to award all damages in a single action, and practically
all cases of consequence will be tried before juries. Therefore,
the question with which we will be concerned is the extent to
which damages recoverable from the person held responsible
under tort law are affected by the plaintiff's receipt of benefits
from a collateral source.
We may now consider the "silent revolution" that is taking
place with respect to the collateral source rule. We have said
that at the time the rule was formulated, it reflected society's
attitude toward the receipt of collateral source benefits. Since
the defendant was truly a "wrongdoer", and since there was an
3
9See the discussion of the "condition of desirable equilibrium" in James,
Social In urance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27
N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 557 (1952). We will be alluding to the "condition of
equilibrium" in a number of contexts, particularly as regarls subrogation.
40 This is because neither plaintiff or defense advocates desire any change in
the present system. Liability insurance companies are opposed to change, and
there is no "pressure group" representing automobile accident victims.
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intention to benefit the plaintiff or the class of people to which
he belonged, it made perfect sense to say that the plaintiff rather
than the defendant should get whatever "windfall" resulted. It
makes no sense today, where our concepts of "wrongdoer" and
"benefit" have changed appreciably. The ordinary tort defendant
is not a moral wrongdoer. It may be an enterpirse held liable
for manufacturing or distributing a defective product. Its "fault"
is in turning out the defective product, 41 and the basis of liability

is really that it is an efficient loss distributor. Most likely the
defendant will be the driver of an automobile, who is perhaps
a morally blameless, accident prone person,4 but who has been
found to be "negligent," whatever that means as applied to an
automobile accident. And his liability will be met by insurance.
The "benefits" the plaintiff has received are not likely to be
considered a "gift" from a generous soul or a society concerned
for needy victims. 43 Unless a more satisfactory explanation can

be given than "the donor did not intend to benefit the wrongdoer," the jury cannot understand why the plaintiff should recover for medical expenses he never incurred, or for lost earnings
when he received the same money he would have received if he
had not been injured. As Professor Kalven put it, "Their plaintiff
sympathy does not extend to compensating the plaintiff for a
loss which some other source has already made good.""
Moreover, the study suggests that the jury may have a
broader concept of "collateral benefits" as operating to diminish
recovery. For example, where the plaintiff was injured while a
passenger in his employer's automobile, the jury may assume
that somehow the employer will take care of him, and this will
affect the size of the verdict. Likewise the jury may assume that
adult children will take care of an injured parent.45 If this is
so, it is clear that they will be most reluctant to award compensation where the loss has already been met from a collateral
source. It is said that "the average man finds the plaintiff a
more unconscionable beneficiary of windfalls than the de41
For the view that it is "fault", see Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products
17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1087-92 (1965).
Liability,
42
See F. HAnPaF and F. JAmvs, 2 THE LAw oF Toars § 11.4 (1956).
43 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YAiE L.J. 728, 742-46 (1964).
44

Kalven, supra note 23, at 169.
45 Id.
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fendant."4 I am not sure that the jury treats the question as
one of windfall. Rather the jury wants to compensate the plaintiff
fully, but does not believe that a person should take advantage
of an accident to "come out ahead." It feels that it is adequately
compensating the plaintiff by giving him what it thinks he lost
and resents what appears to be an attempt to recover twice for
a single loss. It seems clear enough that were the jury advised
of the receipt of collateral source benefits, it would reduce
recovery by that amount.
This, however, is only half of the picture. The fact that the
plaintiff has received benefits from a collateral source may
cause the jury to return a verdict for the defendant on the issue
of liability as well. We have come to realize that the presence
of insurance or the obvious financial responsibility of the defendant enterprise does not necessarily mean that the jury will
return a verdict for the plaintiff. The jury in the particular
case may try to follow the judge's instructions to the letter or
may be willing to depart from them only within certain limits.
If it concludes that the defendant in an automobile accident
case was not at fault, it may return a verdict in his favor, although it knows that the judgment will be paid by his insurer.
They are likely to be attuned to the "increased insurance rate"
argument, and further, they may be unwilling to jeopardize the
defendant's chances of keeping his insurance, assuming they are
also attuned to the restrictive underwriting practices of liability
insurance companies. The significance of the defendant's financial responsibility or insurance may be relevant only in cases of
doubt, that is, if the jury is in doubt as to liability, it may resolve
the doubts in favor of the plaintiff rather than the financially
responsible defendant or the insurance fund.47 It is for this
reason that the controversy over the existence of insurance may
now be academic.48
By the same token, where the plaintiff has received benefits
from a collateral source, the jury may conclude that doubts as
46 Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77
HInv.L. REv. 741, 749 (1964). To the same effect see, Peckinpaugh, An Analysis
of the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 545, 551.
47 See the discussion of this point in Kalven, supra note 23, at 171.
48 See the discussion in W. PaossEn, supra note 16, at 570-71. For a case
holding that the mention of liability insurance did not amount to prejudicial error,
see Waid v. Bergschneider, 94 Ariz. 21, 381 P.2d 568 (1963).
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to liability should be resolved in favor of the defendant. The
plaintiff will not really be uncompensated, and this may seem a
satisfactory compromise to the jury. Defense counsel, at least,
is persuaded that evidence of collateral source benefits may
tip the scales in their favor, and this is the import of the "silent
resolution."49 It is not necessary from their standpoint that the
courts abolish the collateral source rule, so long as evidence that
the plaintiff has received collateral source benefits gets before
the jury. Thus, defense attorneys are trying to accomplish the
same result with respect to collateral source benefits that plaintiffs
attorneys have tried to accomplish with respect to insurance:
to get such evidence before the jury by indirection, contending
that it is relevant for other purposes such as impeachment.
Their hope is that the introduction of such evidence will cause
the jury to resolve doubtful issues of liability and damages in
the defendant's favor. In cases where they succeeded in introducing such evidence at trial, the result was effective; so effective
that most appellate courts which have passed on the question
have concluded that such evidence, like evidence that the defendant is insured, necessarily amounts to prejudicial error.50
The battleground between plaintiff's counsel and defense counsel
is not over whether receipt of benefits from a collateral source
should reduce recovery, but over whether the defense may
introduce such evidence for a "subsidiary purpose."51 Let us now
consider some of the cases where such evidence was introduced.
In my opinion, the clearest example of a case where evidence
of collateral source benefits caused the jury to resolve the
52
liability issue in favor of the defendant is Stanziale v. Musick.
The plaintiff was a passenger, along with some other women,
in an automobile which collided with the defendant's automobile.
The collision appeared to be slight, and the other women said,
in response to the defendant's inquiry after the accident, that
49 For a warning to plaintiffs counsel on this point, see Lambert, The Case
for The Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 530, 540-42.
50 But note the trend toward treating the existence of liability insurance as
immaterial. If the jury assumes that the defendant is insured, but would not
necessarily assume that the plaintiff has received collateral source benefits, it
could well be that the introduction of evidence of liability insurance would amount
to harmless error while the introduction of evidence of collateral source benefits
would51 amount to prejudicial error.
See note 49, supra.
52 370 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1963).
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they "weren't hurt." The plaintiff did not reply. She then asked
the defendant for his name and address "because one of the
women was pregnant." Later the plaintiff sued to recover damages for "back trouble," which she claimed resulted from the
accident. There was conflicting evidence on whether she suffered
any injury. And the evidence on the issue of liability was also
conflicting. The defendant sought to introduce evidence that
the plaintiff, who was working, had accumulated four months
sick leave, all of which she took after the accident. Defendant
also contended the plaintiff claimed "back trouble" for the purpose of using up her sick leave. The court permitted the defendant to introduce the evidence, and the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed,
the court holding that the evidence "bore on the plaintiff's
credibility and was relevant on the issue of whether the accident
was the cause of her claimed disability." The appellate court
also referred to the "peculiar circumstances of the case," as justifying a departure from the rule that evidence of benefits from a
collateral source was not admissible. The defendant had succeeded in his "flanking movement," and the result was a verdict
in his favor.
It is not difficult to conceive of the sick leave benefits influencing the jury to find in favor of the defendant. The case
was contested both on the grounds of liability and on the existence of any harm. A claim of back injury and nothing more
results in minimal jury sympathy; this is not the case of the
"battered plaintiff." The fact that the plaintiff alone claimed
some injury and that she insisted on getting the defendant's
name and address might cause the jury to suspect her of being
"litigation-minded." At this point the jury is probably ready to
find for the defendant. But then they might ask, "What if she
is telling the truth; what if she really was injured?" Now the
fact that she received four months of sick leave becomes very
significant. The jurors do not have to wrestle with their consciences. As a result of the accident she received a four month
vacation with pay, so even if she was injured, she "got something." There is no need for the jury to give her any more, and
they may, with a clear conscience, return a verdict for the
defendant. The evidence of benefits from a collateral source
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may have tipped the scales and caused the jury to resolve
considerable doubts in favor of the defendant. The decision
permitting the defendant to introduce the evidence also seems
correct. There was a genuine dispute as to whether the plaintiff
suffered any injury at all, and the availability of sick leave was
most relevant on this point. But the evidence may well have
affected the jury's decision on the issue of liability, and this
case demonstrates why defense counsel are so anxious to get
this evidence before the jury.
Another case where evidence of the receipt of collateral
benefits may have influenced the jury's decision on the question
of liability is Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Company. 3 In a suit
under the Jones Act,54 an issue was raised as to whether the
plaintiff was a "seaman" and therefore entitled to maintain the
action. The defendant was permitted to introduce evidence that
the plaintiff received compensation under the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act,55 which is inapplicable
to "seamen" covered by the Jones Act. Throughout the trial
counsel for the defendant emphasized this fact, arguing that
the plaintiff did not think he was a "seaman" within the meaning
of the statute. The jury returned a finding that the plaintiff
was not a "seaman and rendered a verdict for the defendant.
It is difficult to see how the question of whether the plaintiff
thought he was a "seaman" had anything to do with whether
he, in fact, was covered by the statute. The Court of Appeals
held that the admission of the evidence was error, but treated
it as "harmless error," saying that it could only prejudice the
issue of damages and not of liability. Since the jury did not
find liability, the evidence could not have been prejudicial.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the jury was
led to place undue emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff obtained benefits under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act, and that this had nothing to do with whether
he was a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act. Perhaps
the jury was influenced by the plaintiffs views as to his status.
53 375 U.S. 34 (1963).
54 37 Stat. 1158 (1915), as amended 46 U.S.C. § 680 (1964).
5544 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1964).
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What is equally probable is that the jury was reluctant to award
what it thought was double compensation, or at least, if it had
doubt about the plaintiff's status, it would resolve that issue
against him, knowing that he had already received some compensation. The dangerous impact that such evidence could have
was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court, and since the
evidence could have slight relevance, if at all, its admission
was held to be reversible error.
The efforts of defense counsel to introduce such evidence
before the jury have been most ingenious. One line of attack
has been to introduce the evidence of collateral benefits ostensibly for the purpose of showing "malingering," that is, because
he has received benefits, the plaintiff does not return to work
when he is able to do so. The argument is that if the plaintiff
has failed to work when able, he has not mitigated damages,
and, therefore, he cannot recover for the lost time.5 6 In the
same vein it is said that the evidence is relevant to show the
absence of permanent injury; the plaintiff has claimed an injury
in order to obtain the benefits. In Eichel v. New York Central
Railroad Company,57 an injured railroad employee sued his employer under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.58 The railroad sought to show that the plaintiff was receiving disability
pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act.5" It was
contended that the evidence was relevant to impeach the testimony of the plaintiff as to the permanency and seriousness of
his injury, i.e., he was making his injury out to be worse than
it was in order to collect the disability pension. The evidence
was excluded in the trial court, and the jury returned a verdict
of $51,000. The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of
damages, holding that the evidence of the receipt of the disability pension should have been admitted. The Supreme Court,
in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals, stating emphatically that
56 Failure to mitigate damages by not accepting employment arises more
frequently in cases of breach of employment contracts. See e.g., Schisler v.
Periection Milker Co., 193 Minn. 160, 258 N.W. 17 (1934). However, it would be
equally relevant where the plaintiff was trying to recover for the value of his
lost time.
573 75 U.S. 253 (1963).
5835 Stat. 65 (1909), as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
59 49 Stat. 967 (1935), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 228b(2)4 (1964).
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under no circumstances was evidence of disability payments
under the Railroad Retirement Act admissible in a FELA case. 0
In our view the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly
outweighs the value of this evidence. Insofar as the evidence
bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be
other evidence having more probative value and involving
less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability
pension.... We have recently had occasion to be reminded
that evidence of a collateral benefit is readily subject to
misuse by a jury [citing Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Company]. It has long been recognized that evidence showing
that the defendant is insured creates a substantial likelihood
of misuse. Similarly we must recognize that the petitioner's
receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact ...61
The reference to "evidence of more probative value" demonstrates that the court is aware that the defendant's purpose in
introducing the evidence of collateral source benefits is not to
prove malingering, but to influence the jury on the issue of
liability. The analogy to insurance buttresses this conclusion.
Other courts have also emphasized that the defendant's real
purpose in introducing the evidence is not to show malingering.
For this reason evidence that the plaintiff's medical expenses
were paid by an indemnity insurer 62 or that he received unemployment compensation 3 has been held inadmissible despite the
contention that this would show a disposition to malinger.
Massachusetts, 64 however, has held that evidence of income from
a collateral source, e.g., sick leave, was admissible to show that
6
Ojustice Harlan took the position that whether to admit such evidence should
be within the trial judge's discretion. Since the trial judge disallowed it, he
favored reversal in the particular case, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the evidence should necessarily be excluded.
61
375 U.S. at 255.
62
Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 154 So.2d 297 (1963).
63 Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (1962). In that case the jury
returned a finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and the court
concluded that it could have been strongly influenced by this evidence. It cited
an earlier case, Lengle v. North Lebanon Township, 274 Pa. 51, 117 A. 403
(1922), where the introduction of evidence to the effect that the beneficiaries in
a wrongful death action had received some compensation was held to be reversible
error. The court in that case observed that "No further suggestion was necessary
to Convince the jury that the township should not be asked to pay more to the
children."
64
McElwain v. Capotosto, 332 Mass. 1, 122 N.E.2d 901 (1954).
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the alleged disability was not the reason that the plaintiff was
not working, and a federal court thought itself bound by that
case to allow evidence of receipt of income from collateral
sources to be admitted on the issue of disability! 5
Another approach has been to try to introduce evidence of
the receipts of pensions or the like as showing an inducement
for the plaintiff to retire from his employment. In Kainer v.
Walker,6 6 where the plaintiff claimed that he was forced to retire because of the accident, the defendant sought to introduce
evidence of the fact that the plaintiff was receiving a veteran's
disability pension. The contention was that the evidence was
relevant to show the plaintiff might have chosen to retire even
if he had not been injured. The court stated that evidence of
the receipt of benefits from a collateral source should be excluded
"unless clearly relevant and with substantial probative value."
Since the pension was some $60 per month and the plaintiff had
been earning $7000 per year, the evidence would have had little,
if any, probative value. Obviously the defendant was trying to
influence the jury to find in his favor, or at least to reduce the
award,67 and the court was not deceived. On the other hand,
in Murray v. New York, N.H. & Hartford Railroad Company,8
the court stated that evidence of pension rights was relevant to
determine probable loss of future earnings, since the availability
of a pension could affect the age at which the plaintiff might
decide to retire. In that case the defendant failed to introduce
any evidence of what the plaintiff's rights were, so the defendant's requested instruction that the jury take pension rights
into account was properly refused. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the jury's determination as to probable loss of future
earnings-a difficult process at best-could not help but be influenced by the fact that the plaintiff could retire on a pension
before reaching normal retirement age, i.e., 65.69 The question
is still whether the prejudicial effect of such evidence under
65

Thompson v. Kawasalci isen, 348 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1965).
66
377 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1964).
67
The plaintiff in that case persuaded the court that the evidence should be
heard in the absence of the jury because of the prejudicial effect it might have.
The court heard the evidence and ruled it inadmissible.
68 255 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1958).

69 We are assuming that in most cases the jury awards damages for loss of
future earning opportunity up to the time the plaintiff would regch the age of 65,
since that is when most people retire,
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the present collateral source rule is such that it should be excluded, and as we will see, the tendency is to exclude it."0
Yet another device to get evidence of Workmen's Compensation benefits before the jury was tried in Mangan v. Broderick
and Bascom Rope Company.71 The defendant was able to get
the evidence before the jury, which returned a verdict in its
favor, but the decision was reversed on appeal. The defendant's
counsel first asked the office manager of the company for which
the plaintiff worked whether the plaintiff had received Workmen's Compensation benefits. The plaintiff's objection was
sustained, and the defendant's counsel was admonished to drop
the point. Undaunted, he then questioned the plaintiff's doctor
as to who paid the bills, and the doctor replied that the employer's insurance company had done so. This was before the
plaintiff's counsel could make his objection, and the court in70

See e.g., Capital Products v. Romer, 252 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Hume v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App.2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Rusk v. Jeffries,
110 N.J.L. 307, 164 A. 313 (Err. & App., 1933); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d
202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961). See also the criticism of Browning on the ground
that the plaintiff "gave value" for the pension. 1963 CAmBa. L.J. 37, 39-40.
However, the disability benefit may be in lieu of other benefits that the
plaintiff would have received but for the injury. In Healy v. Rennert, the plaintiff
alleged that if he had not been injured, he could have retired in two years at
half-pay. The evidence of the disability pension was introduced by the defendant
to counter the plaintiff's claim of loss. Here the jury found for the defendant,
and the court concluded that the introduction of the evidence of the disability
pension was reversible error. See the discussion, supra, note 75. Nonetheless,
since-the disability pension was, in effect, a substitute for the retirement pension,
the plaintiff should not be able to recover the lost retirement pension in addition.
Perhaps because of the posture of the case, this fact escaped the court's notice.
The same situation was involved in Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S,
333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964). In a wrongful death action the plaintiff sought
recovery for half the value of pension payments her deceased husband would
have received upon retirement. She had received death benefits, which she
would not have received if he had lived. The court correctly reasoned that she
was entitled either to the death benefits or the loss of retirement benefits, but not
both. However, it was applying New York law and read Healey to hold that
damages for the loss of future benefits were recoverable without regard to the
benefits received. In such a case it seems that the claim for the future benefits
necessarily opens up the question of the present benefits. Unless the plaintiff can
show (and perhaps this could be done at the pre-trial conference) that the loss
of future benefits was greater, in which case he should be limited to the excess,
he should not be permitted to claim those benefits.
See e.g., A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Ligon, -285 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1960);
McMinn v. Thompson, 61 N.M. 387, 301 P.2d 326 (1956); Stone v. City of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 166, 931 P.2d 179 (1964). In all of these cases the
defendant claimed that the evidence was relevant for a subsidiary purpose, e.g.,
to show a reason for the plaintiff to take the benefit rather than work. ...
71351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965).
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structed the jury to disregard the evidence. It chastised the
defendant's counsel, but did not order a mistrial. The judgment
in favor of the defendant was reversed on appeal, the court rejecting the argument that the evidence was admissible to show
bias on the part of the office manager. The tenor of the argument was that if the plaintiff recovered from the defendant,
the employer would be reimbursed for the Workmen's Compensation payments. 2 This being so, the fact that the plaintiff had
received such payments was relevant to show the bias of the
office manager. The court doubted whether a low-ranldng employee would perjure himself so that the employer could obtain
reimbursement from the defendant. The probative value was
too slight to outweigh the obvious prejudicial effect, and the
evidence was excluded.
Most courts now recognize that the introduction of evidence
of collateral source benefits can affect not only the question of
damages, but the issue of liability as well. As one court put it,
"The smell of insurance or workmen's compensation must be
presumed to affect a jury adversely to a plaintiff's cause."7 3 This

being so, at least where the evidence does not have a high degree
of relevance, 74 its introduction necessarily amounts to reversible

error.7 Some courts still treat this as harmless error, suggesting
As we will see, this is required in most states.
Mangan v. Broderick and Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965).
it did
.Asin Stanziale v. Musick, 370 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1963). There the
court referred to the "peculiar circumstances of the case."
7 See Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647
(Alas. 1963), where the court expressly stated that the introduction of such
evidence would likely influence the jury on the issue of liability as well as damages.
See also Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961), where the
court held that evidence that the plaintiff had received a disability pension and
health insurance benefits was inadmissible and that the introduction of such
evidence amounted to reversible error. The jury had returned a verdict for the
defendant, and the court observed:
They may well have considered that the plaintiff had sustained no
damage, especially in view of the acceleration and increase in the amount
of payments of laintiff's pension, and may have decided the case on
the basis that plaintiff was not harmed rather than on the questions of
negligence and contributory negligence. Id.
Comnare Gladden v. P. Henderson Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967), where
the plaintiff, who had testified that he returned to work and failed to see his
doctor because he needed money to pay his bills, was asked on cross-examination
whether during the period when he was disabled his employer had made it
poyihle for him to receive financial assistance. The court allowed the question,
and the plaintiff answered that he bad received around $70 per week, apparently
benefits under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act. The admission of this
evidence waz held to be proper, since it waq relevant to refute the contention of
the plaintiff that he returned to work and failed to see his doctor due to economic
72
73
4

(Continued on next page)
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that the plaintiff must seek a corrective instruction7m but on the
whole, the prejudicial effect of such evidence has been recognized
by the courts. The "silent revolution" has not succeeded very
much more than has the frontal attack on the rule.
However, the attempts to introduce the evidence by indirection have been thwarted on the assumption that the
plaintiff's recovery is not affected by the receipt of benefits from
a collateralsource. The fact that the jury is prejudiced by the
knowledge that the plaintiff has received collateral source benefits would indicate that the collateral source rule itself conflicts
with the "conscience of the community." As pointed out previously, the concept that the benefit was intended for the plaintiff
and not the defendant makes no sense today. It still seems to
the jury that the plaintiff is being compensated twice. Perhaps
there is a more realistic way to deal with the problem of cumulative recovery. If a more satisfactory rationale for cumulative
recovery were advanced, the jury might not be so hostile to the
idea; and in those situations where evidence of the receipt of a
collateral benefit could be considered by the jury, the jury
would not use this to justify to itself a denial of recovery. Certainly this makes more sense than the present pattern, where
recovery is said not to be affected by the receipt of benefits
from a collateral source, but defense counsel does try to introduce
such evidence by indirection for the "dynamite potential" it
will have on the jury. Let us first ask whether the collateral
source rule as a solution to the problem of cumulative recovery
can now be justified.
The collateral source rule is often discussed in terms of the
conflict between overcompensating the plaintiff and enabling
the defendant to reduce his liability, thereby receiving a "windfall." If the plaintiff recovers the value of the benefit he has
received from the collateral source, he will have recovered twice
for the same loss; but if the defendant avoids liability, he will
not have to pay for all the harm he has caused. In the leading
case of Coyne v. Campbell,77 where the New York Court of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

necessity. The court stressed that it was the plaintiff's testimony on direct examina-

tion which
opened up the matter.
76
Dewitz v. Columbia River Paper Co., 237 Ore. 623, 391 P.2d 613 (1964).
77

11

N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962).
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Appeals rejected the collateral source rule as applied to a physician who had received free treatment from a colleague and
from his own nurse, Judge Desmond stated: "Diminution of
damages because medical services were furnished gratuitously
results in a windfall of sorts to a defendant but allowance of
such items
although not paid for would unjustly enrich a
78
plaintiff."
The implication is that the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff
is worse than the unjust exculpation of the defendant. Judge
Fuld, on the other hand, saw it from the plaintiff's perspective.
As he observed: "The rationale underlying the rule is that a
wrongdoer, responsible for injuring the plaintiff, should not
receive a windfall." He went on to point out that "The medical
services were supplied to help the plaintiff, not to relieve the
defendant from any part of his liability or to benefit him." To
deny recovery, he concluded, "would be unfair and illogical."79
Commentators also see the conflict between the compensatory
principle and the principle that the party responsible should
bear the full loss he has caused. 0 As one writer stated, in
analyzing the rule:
It is true, in many cases, that a double recovery is thus permitted by the liberality of the courts in interpreting this rule,
but this is consistent with the view of our courts that it is
better to permit the claimant to 'accumulate his remedies'
than to grant the tort feasor the benefits of payments that
come to the plaintiff from 'collateral sources.' The wrongdoer, the courts feel, is not entitled to such an undeserved
windfall.Sl

Thus, defense lawyers stress the need to apply the compensatory
approach,82 while plaintiff's lawyers warn that if the rule is not
applied, "the guilty rather than the innocent will benefit from
at 374, 183 N.E.2d at 893.
79Id. at 375, 183 N.E.2d at 894-95.
80 See Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 OMo ST. L.J. 231, 240
(1960); West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16 OxLA. L. RIv. 395, 413-14 (1963); Note, The Mitigating Effect of
Damages on Social Welfare Programs, 63 HARv. L. REv. 330, 331 (1949); Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages: The CollateralSource Rule, 77 HInv. L. REv.
740, 741-42 (1964).
81 Averbach, supra note 80, at 240.
82 See Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J.
545, 555.
781d.
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a windfall."83 Perhaps the problem is not all that serious, but
84
nonetheless many are troubled by this conflict between ideals.
If the sole question were overcompensation of the plaintiff
as opposed to a windfall for the defendant, clearly the defense
would have the better of the argument. For, as we pointed out,
it is absurd today to think of most tort defendants as some kind
of moral wrongdoer. The defendant is simply the individual or
enterprise to whom the loss has been shifted on the basis of
some notion of "fault," and who will redistribute it either through
liability insurance or as a cost of carrying on the enterprise. It
is absurd to conceive of "punishing" the insurance fund or the
enterprise for the wrong. Even if the award of damages was
considered to have accident-deterring effect,85 it is difficult to
see how the award of damages without deducting collateral
source benefits enhances the deterrence achieved by the award
of damages in the first place.8 6 And to the extent the primary
purpose of tort law is compensation, any rule that' espouses
overcompensation must be rejected.87
Of course, the statement of the problem in these terms is not
at all realistic, for we have no way of "knowing" whether in a
given case the award overcompensates or undercompensates.
We have pointed out the difficulties inherent in determining personal injury damages, and the process of adversary litigation
that we employ with trial before a jury makes them all the more
so. Indeed, plaintiff's lawyers are concerned about the "adequate
award, "8 while the defense counsel hastens to remind us that
the personification of justice is represented by a balancing scale
rather than by a cornucopia.89 In practical operation, some
plaintiff's are overcompensated and others are undercompen8
3
84

Lambert, The Case for the CollateralSource Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 531, 543.
Professor Kalven says that this is a problem "to which there is no altogether satisfactory solution." Kalven, The Juru, the Law and the PersonalInjury
Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158, 169 (1958).
85See the discussion of the relationship between tort liability and the

deterrence of accident-producing conduct in F. HARP'ER and F. Ja-ss, 2 THE LAw

OF TORTS,
§ 12.4 (1956).
86
See the discussion
87

of this point in West, suvra note 80, at 412.
See Tames, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. 1Ev. 537, 546 (1952).
88 M. BELnr, THE MoRE ADEQUATE AWARD (1952).
89 1 cannot recall where I saw this phrase, but it does seem to succinctly
summarize the position of defense advocates.
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sated. 0 To say, therefore, that the plaintiff is to recover "only
those damages that he actually sustained, no less than his full
damages, but no more,""1 is clearly to misstate the problem. Our
system, both in theory and practice, does not lend itself to that
kind of measurement. We do arrive at a conclusion as to what
his damages were and try to translate that conclusion into money
terms, but this is only a guess. To treat that guess as representing
scientific certainty is pure fantasy. The statement of the problem
as a conflict between overcompensation and windfall misses the
mark if it assumes that absent this problem, there would be accurately-measured compensation. 9 2 The most that can be done
is to talk in terms of probability and risk. Do we increase the
risk of overcompensation (or reduce the extent of undercompensation) by excluding consideration of benefits from a collateral source, or do we increase the risk of undercompensation
(or reduce the extent of overcompensation) by allowing such
benefits to be considered? Either way the risk of overcompensation or undercompensation remains, because it is the system
itself that creates the problem. The question is whether we
"feed data" of collateral source benefits into the machine so as
to increase the probability of undercompensation or ignore this
factor and thereby increase the probability of overcompensation.
Even within this framework, however, proponents and opponents of the rule can find justification for their positions. The
opponents would say that the jury should not consider awarding
the plaintiff certain damages, "if he did not sustain damage in
a particular area."93 This being so, recovery will necessarily be
less, and the risk of undercompensation becomes more probable
than the risk of overcompensation. The proponents, on the other
90

In this connection settlement practices must also be taken into account.
Studies indicate that the plaintiff who has sustained relatively little loss is more
likely to be overcompensated by a settlement, since it may be less expensive for
the insurer or enterprise to settle such claims for more than they are worth than
to engage in litigation. See Morris and Paul, The FinancialImpact of Automobile
Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913, 920-26 (1962). However, a particular plaintiff
who has suffered extensive injuries still may be overcompensated when out of
pocket loss is considered.
91 Peekinpaugh, supra note 82, at 555.
92 But this assumption is made. See e.g., West, supra note 80, at 82. "The
collateral source rule only involves allowing double recovery for an injury which
has been wholly or partially repaired."
93 Peckinpaugh, supra note 82, at 551.
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hand remind us that no personal injury award really compensates.
By definition, something like pain and suffering cannot be
quantified. Litigation is an inconvenience for which no compensation is made. Awards are affected by inflation, and the
plaintiff does not obtain full recovery, because the attorney's
contingent fee must be deducted.94 Therefore, they would say,
the risk of overcompensation is to be preferred to the risk of
undercompensation. While these facts are true, the obvious reply
is that this does not furnish a rational justification for the collateral source rule.95 If our method of awarding compensation
for personal injuries is inadequate, there must be a sounder solution than that of chance recovery in an individual case. If A
and B each suffer loss estimated by the jury at $50,000, and A
has received $10,000 in collateral source benefits, the rule helps
to make the award more adequate for A, but does not help B.
Moreover, while such factors do operate to reduce the plaintiff's
award, he may have been grossly overcompensated unless we
take the position that no amount is ever too much to be awarded
an injured person. The question is still whether we increase the
risk of overcompensation or increase the risk of undercompensation. The application of the collateral source rule in the cases
where such benefits have been received does not represent a
rational solution to the problem of the "adequate award."
Some commentators would deal with the problem of what
they see to be cumulative recovery by providing for reimbursement or subrogation to the payor of the collateral source benefit.98
There would then be no double recovery by the plaintiff nor
windfall to the defendant. This is a deceptively simple solution,
as subsequent analysis will indicate. In the first place, this
assumes that either the plaintiff's damages have been measured
accurately, or that the item represented by the collateral source
payment has been identified. As we have said, it is absurd to
think that the plaintiff's damages have been measured with any
degree of scientific accuracy, and under a general verdict procedure the jury does not itemize damages. Suppose that a
94

See Lambert, supra note 83, at 542.
95 See James, supra note 87, at 549; West, supra note 80, at 411; Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages, supra note 80, at 750.
96 This is the essential thesis of West, supra note 80. See also Note, Unreason
in the Law of Damages, supra note 80, at 753.
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generous donor has paid the plaintiffs bill at a convalescence
home, where he stayed following his injury. The plaintiff introduces the bill, say $5000, into evidence; the defendant contends that the period of convalescence was unnecessary and that
the plaintiff should not recover that sum. The jury returns a
verdict for $30,000. Perhaps the jury awarded the plaintiff that
sum and perhaps it did not. Perhaps it found that his damages
were $50,000, but that he was also at fault, and reduced his damages by 40%; thus, he would have only recovered $3000 of the
bill. The possibilities are endless. Moreover, as we will see, there
are situations where no double recovery occurs, although the
plaintiff retains the collateral source benefit and theoretically
recovers full damages. Subrogation is most relevant in the insurance context, and we will discuss it at that time. It is sufficient
to point out that subrogation involves a variety of considerations
relating to the marketing of insurance and the payment of insurance benefits. If subrogation is to take place, it must be with
reference to those considerations; and the nature of the insurance
business should not be altered for the sake of theoretical consistency, that is, to avoid the conflict between double recovery
and windfall. While we have found wanting the justifications
thus far advanced for the collateral source rule as a solution to
the problem of cumulative recovery, the reimbursement-subrogation approach needs a much different justification than that it
avoids the dilemma between double recovery and windfall.
Dean Maxwell, a proponent of the collateral source rule,
has advanced a rationale that avoids the "overcompensationwindfall" dilemma, and this may be called the "orderly administration of justice" approach.9" Discussing the rule in a number
of contexts, he finds most of the results justified on this basis.
For example, as to "gratuities", he observes that: "To open to
fruitful investigation by the defense in a personal injury case
the question of the economic framework within which the needs
of the plaintiff resulting from the injury were fiunished is to
make recovery depend on how knowledgeably the plaintiff and
his benefactors set up their transaction." 98 He points out, as
97

Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,

46 Mnw. L. R,.669 (1961).
98 Id. at 688.
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we have done, the inadequacy of our present system of compensation, in that it does not limit awards to strict economic
loss and at the same time guarantee such recovery. 9 He says
that if a different system were adopted, most of the problems to
which the collateral source rule applies a "rough solution"
could be eliminated. He concludes:
For the present system, however, the rule seems to perform
a needed function. At the very least, it removes some com-

plex issues from the trial scene. At its very best, in some
cases, it operates as an instrument of what most of us would

be willing to call justice. 100

Perhaps this is true,' I am impressed by the "orderly administration of justice" argument, and I will have occasion to allude
to this idea further. However, I am still faced with the question
of what to do about the problem of cumulative recovery within
our present system of awarding compensation for personal injuries. Since I am not at all optimistic that this system will be
changed in the foreseeable future, the problem is an important
one. I cannot accept the collateral source rule as a sound solution. 02 I think we can do better. And this is the thesis of the
present writing. It is possible to deal with the question of cumulative recovery without reference to the collateral source rule.
It is possible to approach the question with reference to functional considerations and to determine whether the fact that
the plaintiff received a particularbenefit should have any effect
03
If
of his recovery of damages in a suit for personal injuries.
it is concluded that the receipt of the benefit should affect his
recovery, we can then address ourselves to what may be called
the "procedural problem," that is, how we bring this factor into
991d. at 695.
100 Id.

'o For the same conclusion, see Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41
B.U. L. REv. 348, 363 (1961); Averbach, supra note 80, at 240.
102 This writing, therefore, will not be a study of the collateral source rule.
No attempt has been made to investigate or discuss all the cases that have dealt
with the problem of cumulative recovery. A number of cases will be cited and
discussed as illustrative, but that is as far as we will go. A rather complete
compilation of cases will be found in West, supra note 80.
103 It has been suggested that "invocation of the 'rule' has too often been a
substitute for analysis of the merits of the parties' claims." Note, Unreason in the
Law of Damages, supra note 80, at 753. Although courts have sometimes distinguished between various types of benefits, the problem usually is not approached
with reference to the particular benefit involved.
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the system under which we award recovery. Perhaps certain
facts could be stipulated: if, for example, it is concluded that
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover certain medical expenses
from the defendant, this could be handled at the pre-trial conference, and the plaintiff would be precluded from introducing
such evidence. Where the receipt of the benefit would not be
deemed to affect recovery, evidence of such benefits for any
purpose would be rigorously excluded. It might also be feasible
to deduct certain sums from the judgment in a proper case. 04
Actually, I believe that if such an approach were adopted, and
collateral source benefits were not necessarily eliminated, the

jury would understand the justification for permitting what may
seem like double recovery, and the dynamite potential would
be absent.
The collateral source rule does not represent a realistic solution to the problem of cumulative recovery. It is, therefore, an
irrelevant principle. It was developed at a time when either
the plaintiff paid for medical and hospital expenses or was the
recipient of "charity." Generally either the plaintiff worked or
he received a true "gratuity" from his employer. In an era of
Blue Cross, Medicare, sick leave, Social Security and enterprise
liability, some other solution seems necessary. Rather than
classify a benefit as "collateral' and say that, therefore, it cannot affect recovery, we must consider the nature of the benefit,
and the economic and practical factors involved, and then conelude how receipt of that benefit should affect recovery of personal injury damages. We are proposing what may be called
for want of a better term, the functional approach.
ThE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

I propose to demonstrate the functional approach by a con-

sideration of three situations involving (1) the damaged doctor,
(2) the soldier retired with a disability pension, and (3) the
insured accident victim. We will be moving from African villages
04

See Chambers v. Pinson, 6 Ohio App. 2d 66, 216 N.E.2d 394 (1966),
where the court held that credit for benefits received under the medical payments
provision of an automobile insurance policy could be given by a reduction in the
judgment. Therefore, it was erroneous to instruct the jury that the plaintiff had
received such benefits. The use of the post-judgment credit avoids the possibility,
that the jury will "put the evidence of the benefit to improper use."
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to modern courts to computers and back again, but the reader
can easily follow our flight.
I. The Damaged Doctor.
The damaged doctor is the plaintiff in Coyne v. Campbell.0 5
He was "damaged" in an automobile accident which occurred
when his automobile was struck in the rear by the defendant's.
Essentially he sustained a whiplash injury. Since he was a
physician, he received medical treatment from a fellow physician
without charge. Physiotherapy treatments were given by his
nurse during regular office hours, without charge. He claimed
approximately $2200 as damages for the medical and nursing
care, but the trial court excluded any evidence on this point.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but he was dissatisfied and appealed, charging error in the exclusion of the
evidence as to the reasonable value of the medical and nursing
care. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
The case reflected the conflict between overcompensation and
windfall, the majority rejecting the collateral source rule and
taking the position that the plaintiff could not recover the reasonable value of the medical and nursing expenses. The dissenting opinion maintained that the wrongdoer-whom, you will
recall was the presumably insured001 driver of the other automobile, should not receive a windfall. Since that decision two
cases involving identical facts have arisen in other jurisdictions,
and both courts held that the value of the services was recoverable since "they were given to benefit the plaintiff and not
07
the defendant."
These cases were decided under our system of awarding
compensation for damages resulting from automobile accidents,
which means a suit for negligence tried before a jury. This
being so, certain limitations necessarily appear. The suit may
be prosecuted only by the accident victim, assuming he is alive,
although his injury may have caused others to suffer adverse
consequences. We think of an accident in terms of the impact
it has on the immediate victim. But, in reality, an accident should
105 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962).
108 If he had not insured, it is not likely that suit would have been brought.

107 Nelson v. Federal Mogul Service, 27 Pa. D.&C.2d 222 (1962); Odde v.
Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 CR.I. 1966).
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be viewed as a circle with the victim in the center and the effects
of the accident radiating outward like ripples in a stream. Suppose all persons who were affected by the accident could present
claims for compensation. Generally our law does not allow this
to occur. A spouse may have a claim for loss of consortium, 1 8
a husband for medical expenses incurred on behalf of the wife,
and a parent for those incurred on behalf of the child; 0 9 but
others affected by the accident do not possess a cause of action.
If an accident results in the closing of a factory, the employee
who is thereby out of work cannot recover his lost wages from
the torffeasor 10° A valuable employee may be lost to the employer for months as a result of an automobile accident, but
the employer generally cannot recover for the loss. 1 In our
cases the physician and nurse would have no claim against the
defendant. All recovery is awarded to the immediate victim of
the accident, and any settlement he makes with others is not
determined by the court hearing his claim against the tortfeasor.
Suppose we are not in New York. Let us transpose our case
to an African village where the court is that of the chief, sitting
with elders under a tree.11 2 The chief is not confronted with
problems of "duty," 'limitation of liability," "procedure." He
does not rely on the "system" to produce a just and sound result.
He is the system, and the responsibility is on his shoulders.
Periodically it might be desirable for us to examine our system
and its law from the perspective of the chief trying to administer
justice under the tree. Where a rule of our system requires a
result different from the decision we would reach if we were
sitting under the tree, perhaps the rule-and possibly the system
-needs some reconsideration. At least by putting ourselves in
the position of the chief, we can strip away that which comprises
108 See generally, W. Pnossmi, ToRTs § 119 (3rd. ed. 1964).

109 Id.
110 See

1946).

.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App.

111 See Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District v. Croydon Corp., [1957]
2 Q.B. 154 (C.A. 1956); City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,
337 Pa. 1, 10 A.2d 434 (1940). C.f. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif.
332 U.S. 301 (1947). See generally the discussion in Maxwell, supra note 97,
at 682-86; Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALIF.
L. REy. 1478, 1485-98 (1966).
1 12
For a discussion of the nature of a "court" in a primitive legal system see
A. HoEHEL, THE LAW OF PRnmwE MAN 23-28 (1954). See also T. Ew.as, THE
NATunE OF AFmicAw CUsTomARY LAw 212-15 (1962).
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the trappings of the system and imposes its limitations. Coyne
v. Campbell is brought before the chief. Excuse the incongruities
that follow from transplanting the New York automobile accident to the African village.
Unencumbered by rules of real party of interest and "those
to whom a duty is owed," the chief summons all persons who
have been affected by the doctor's accident. The defendant is
there, with his insurer, ready to make any payments the chief
decrees. The doctor points to his whiplash and the neck brace
he is wearing. The chief directs that the defendant shall pay
the cost of the neck brace and a sum of money to compensate
the doctor for past, present and future pain and suffering. The
plaintiff missed a week of work. He is a doctor, and his time is
very expensive. Since the tortfeasor "takes his victim as he
finds him,"-"3 it was unfortunate the defendant is a doctor. The
doctor is compensated for the value of his lost time. If the
plaintiff were less affluent, the lost income could have had an
adverse effect on his family. Even so, this can be taken care of
by awarding the plaintiff the lost income, and it is assumed that
he will take care of his family as he would have done if he
had not been injured.
At this point the persons who had appointments with the
plaintiff during the period in which he was incapacitated come
forward and complain that they were forced to postpone their
appointments or consult another doctor. The New York court
would say that this interest is not substantial and that, in any
event, the defendant owed no "duty" to them. I think our chief
could agree that this interest was not important enough to
justify awarding damages; "inconvenience" is not the kind of
thing for which a legal system would grant compensation.
The doctor then tells about his medical treatment and
physiotherapy. The chief gives this claim short shrift by saying,
"You didn't pay anything for this treatment, so, of course, you
can't recover. You didn't pay the doctor, and your nurse wasn't
paid anything above her regular salary. Let me hear from those
who rendered the services." Note how the chiefs judgment
113 This is usually thought of in terms of the plaintiff's phyical condition, as
in the case of the "thin-skulled man." See Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669,
679. But the principle is equally applicable to the plaintiff's economic condition,
and it is "cheaper" to hit a rich man than a poor one.
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differs from that of the court in Coyne v. Campbell. Both the
court and the chief agree that the plaintiff should not recover
the value of these services, because he did not pay anything for
them. But once the court arrived at that decision, the matter
of the claim for these services was at an end. The only party
who had a "legal right" to make the claim, and who, under the
rules of procedure, could bring suit against the defendant, was
not entitled to recover. The chief, however, can call the people
who actually rendered the services and permit them to make
the claim. When he questions the nurse, she answers that she
performed the services during her normal working hours. The
chief concludes that there is no reason to award her anything,
since she was ifot adversely affected by the accident her employer suffered. She does not have to be paid for treatments she
gave her employer during working hours. The physician has
treated the plaintiff and argues that the defendant should pay
for such treatment, since it was his fault that it was necessary.
There appears to be some justice in this claim. But when the
chief reflects a moment, he angrily dismisses the physician. "You
people have an arrangement by which you treat each other
without charge. You treated the plaintiff today; he or someone
else will treat you or your family tomorrow. You doctors can't
'suffer" damages for medical services, because by the nature of
your profession you get (and give) free services. Just because
there's a tort doesn't mean that you should be paid for the
services rendered a colleague."
And now we come back to New York, refreshed by our
excursion, and perhaps we see Coyne v. Campbell in a different
light. If the tortfeasor "takes his victim as he finds him," this
should work both ways. Where the plaintiff was a physician,
the defendant and his insurer will have to pay higher damages
for the plaintiff's lost time. But he will not be liable for medical
expenses, because his victim gets those services free. No one
lost anything by the nurse's giving the physiotherapy treatment.
The real question revolves around the services of the other
physician. The short answer is that the physician cannot recover for those services, since the system doesn't allow it. We
could let the plaintiff recover as his representative, assuming
he would then reimburse the physician for the value of his time.
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But there is a serious question whether, in accordance with
11.
medical ethics, he could accept payment from the plaintiff;
and, in any event, it is not likely that he would do so. The
more telling reason to me is that the doctors treat each other
without charge. They are not likely to alter this practice so
that there can be occasional recovery against a torifeasor. Therefore, the doctor plaintiff does not need to recover damages for
medical expenses, which, by virtue of his profession, he does
not incur. When viewed from the functional approach, the result in Coyne v. Campbell is correct.
Let us now vary the facts. An old derelict is run over by
an automobile. A crowd gathers, and someone calls out, "Get
a doctor." A doctor appears, and the derelict begs, "Doctor,
please help me." The doctor does so, and in fact, saves his
life. A lawyer also was in the crowd, and when the derelict is
released from the hospital, he files suit against the tortfeasor.
There is no doubt that as part of his damages he can recover
the value of the doctor's services. By requesting (or accepting)
the doctor's assistance, he impliedly promised to pay the reasonable value of those services and so became "legally obligated."
Since he had an obligation to pay for the services, their reasonable
value is treated as an "out-of-pocket" loss.
Suppose, however, that what the derelict says is, "Doctor,
don't waste your time with me, I can never pay you anything."
The doctor, as I believe most would, brushes this aside, saying
sincerely, "I don't care about money now, I want to try and save
your life." The doctor succeeds, and again the derelict sues
the tortfeasor. This case is different, since the services were
rendered "gratuitously." If the court follows the collateral source
rule, the plaintiff can recover, because "the services were rendered
for his benefit and not for the benefit of the wrongdoer.""'; But
if it rejects the collateral source rule, and holds that the plaintiff
can recover only for "sums expended or obligations incurred,"
recovery would be denied, as these services were rendered
"gratuitously."
114 As I understand it, a physician will not accept compensation from another
physician (apart from psychiatrists) for treating him or a member of his family.
I do not believe, however, that there is a formal "canon of ethics" to this effect

It is customary
to give a substantial gift to the physician who donated his services.
115 See Dablin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312, 45 N.W.2d 833 (1950).
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If these cases came before our African chief, who is not
sophisticated in the distinctions between binding obligations and
gratuitous services-which, in our examples, depend on whether
the injured person cried out, "Doctor, please help me," or whether,
conscious of his poverty, he told the doctor he couldn't pay-he
would see the cases as identical. He would say to the doctor,
"My boy, you have performed well, and we are proud of you,"
and to the defendant, "Pay the doctor the reasonable value of his
services." Certainly we would agree that the doctor should be
paid. But our system does not allow the doctor to make a claim
against the tortfeasor."( If we give recovery to the plaintiff and
depend on him to pay the physician, I wonder if he is any more
or less likely to pay in the "gratuity" situation than in the "legal
obligation" situation. In any event, the only possibility that
the physician treating the derelict has of recovering his fee is
to allow the plaintiff to recover it from the tortfeasor. The system
under which we operate prevents us from making the tortfeasor
pay the physician's fee. So, most courts will allow the plaintiff
to recover the value of his services and hope that he will pay
the physician. They think that they lack the machinery in the
personal injury suit to insure that the physician will receive his
fee.
But do they? Any court has the power to issue a conditional
11 7
decree, whether the action is historically "legal" or "equitable."
These decrees have been issued to protect third parties or the
public.11 8 Where medical services have been rendered "gratuitously," the court can direct the plaintiff to pay the physician
a reasonable fee out of the judgment. English courts, which, it
must be remembered, assess the damages in personal injury cases,
have included a direction to repay in their judgments. In Dennis
v. London PassengerTransport Board," 9 the accident victim had
received a pension from the Ministry of Pensions and sick pay
from his employer, a municipal council. The defendant argued
that the verdict should be reduced by those amounts, since the
116 Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
117

See Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16

L. REV. 639, 714-15 (1962).
RuTErns
8

11 See Medical Fabrics Co. v. D. C. McLintock Co., 12 N.J. Super 177 79
A.2d 313 (App. Div. 1951); Hartman v. Cohen, 350 Pa. 41, 38 A.2d 22 (19445.
19 [1948] 1 All E.R. 779 (K.B.).
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plaintiff was not legally required to reimburse the Ministry and
his employer. However, the court found that reimbursement was
"expected." It, therefore, permitted full recovery subject to
a
direction to reimburse. So too, in Schneider v. Eisovitch,2 0 the
plaintiff was permitted to recover the cost of bringing her husband's body back to England notwithstanding that the expenses
were paid by friends. She was required to state that she would
pay the money to the donors. A direction to repay would avoid
the dilemma of overcompensation versus windfall, and some
commentators have advocated this solution for gratuity cases.12 '
Even where juries render the verdict, the court could include a
direction to repay the sum admittedly expended. It would then
be up to the donor to decide whether he wanted to accept it.
As a practical matter, if this procedure were followed, defense
counsel would not find it advantageous to raise the question.
His interest is in reducing recovery and not in the distribution
of the judgment.
The point is that where the plaintiff recovers for "gratuitous"
services rendered by a physician, the recovery may be justified
on the ground that the plaintiff is really recovering as the "representative" of the physician. This may be the only practical way
the physician will be paid. If the court were really concerned
about protecting the physician, it could issue a direction to
repay. Moreover, "gratuitous" is a relative concept. The understanding between the plaintiff and the physician may be that if
the plaintiff recovers a judgment from the tortfeasor, he is expected to make payment. Or, suppose that the plaintiff is a
relative of the physician, and the physician has always treated
him free of charge. If the plaintiff is involved in an accident,
it still does not seem unfair to require the torifeasor to compensate the physician, and this is done by permitting the plaintiff to recover the value of his services. Unlike the physician
who rendered the services in Coyne v. Campbell, the physician
in the last example does not receive free treatment from the
plaintiff in return. Where the plaintiff has not suffered out-ofpocket loss, but still seeks recovery, the proper question may
[1960] 2 W. L.R. 169 (Q.B.).
See West supra note 80, at 414; Ganz, Mitigation of Damages by Benefits
Received, 25 MOD. L. REv. 559, 568 (1962).
120
121
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be whether the plaintiff is really recovering on behalf of someone
who cannot sue in his own right. If this is so, and the plaintiff
is the "appropriate representative" of the person who is really
entitled to be compensated, the recovery is justified.
By going to the African village we have succeeded in
eliminating the collateral source rule in the case of the damaged
doctor. Now let us leave the primitive for the most modernthe world of computers-and consider the case of the soldier who
has been retired with a disability pension.
II. The Retired Soldier and His DisabilityPension.
An American serviceman, stationed in England, was seriously
injured in an automobile accident while on duty. His arm had
to be amputated, and he ceased to be of value to the military.
Since he was injured in the line of duty and forced to retire
from the service as a result of those injuries, a grateful govern122
ment will provide him with a pension for the rest of his life.
When he brought suit against the tortfeasor in England, the
defendant contended that his pension should be considered in
determining the damages for loss of future earnings. The trial
court refused to take the pension into account, and awarded
damages of £25,000. In Browning v. The War Office,123 the
Court of Appeal held that the disability pension had to be considered, and reduced the award to £14,000. English courts rely
heavily on precedent,12 so it is useful to consider the precedents
that faced the Court of Appeal. Traditionally the insurance
proceeds would not operate to reduce recovery, 25 since the plaintiff "had bought the insurance benefits with his own money."' 26
So too, the award in the personal injury action would not be
affected by charitable gifts,

27

nor by the receipt of sums of

money which the plaintiff was obligated or had undertaken to
12 2 70A Stat. 91 (1956), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964).
123 [1963] 1 Q.B. 750 (C.A. 1962).
124 The House of Lords has only recently

held that it has the power to depart
from prior holdings. See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [19661 3 All
E.R. 77, and Dias, Precedents in the Home of Lords-A Much Needed Reform,
1966 Cwm3.
LJ. 153.
25
1 See Bradburn v. Great Western Railway Co., [18741 L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (C.A.).
26
1 Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759 (C.A. 1962).
127 Peacock v. Amusement Equipment Co., [1954] 2 Q.B. 347 (C.A.). See
the discussion in Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759 (C.A. 1962).
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repay. 128 On the other hand, where the plaintiff had received
pay "as of right," he could not recover for the value of lost time
during the period for which he was paid; this would include
sick leave and what the English call "half-pay." 9 English courts
do not approach the problem of cumulative recovery via the
collateral source rule. Each "benefit" is considered separately,
and in accordance with certain criteria, the court decides whether
it should affect the recovery of damages. The question was into
what category a disability pension fell.
If the plaintiff had died, recovery in the wrongful death
action would not have been affected by the pension. This is
specifically provided in the Fatal Accidents Act of 1959.130 And
as will be seen, specific provision is also made for social insurance
benefits in the personal injury action. 3 ' However, the matter
of pensions as affecting recovery in a personal injury action is
not regulated by statute, and, therefore, will depend on judicial
determination. The court in Browning was faced with Payne v.
Railway Executive, 32 which involved a British serviceman who
received a pension following his discharge from service as a
result of the accident. The nature of the pension differed substantially from that paid to the American serviceman, since the
Minister of Pensions had the power to reduce or withhold the
pension where the recipient also recovered damages against a
torffeasor who caused the injury. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the pension should not be deducted from the
award. Cohen, L.J., based his decision on the ground that the
accident was not the causa causans of the receipt of the pension;
the causa causans was the plaintiff's service in the Royal Navy,
and the accident was the sine qua non, Singleton, L.J., discussed the relationship between the pension rights and the pay
of the serviceman-to which we will allude shortly-but based
his decision on the ground that the Minister could reduce the
pension if there was recovery from a tortfeasor. In actual practice,
28
1
See the discussion in Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759
(C.A. 1962).
129 Id. See Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District v. Croydon Corp.,
[19571 2 Q.B. 154 (C.A. 1956).
130 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 65.
131 See also the discussion in Ganz, Mitigation of Damages by Benelits Received, 25 MOD. L. REv. 559, 566 (1962).
132 [1952] 1 K.B. 26 (C.A. 1951).
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the Minister reduced disability pensions by the annuity value
of 25o of the total damages recovered from the tortfeasor.
In Browning, Denning, M.R., disposed of Payne by adopting
the rationale in Singleton's opinion. If he had adopted the
rationale of Cohen's opinion, Browning could not have been distinguished, because here too the accident was not the causa
causans of the receipt of the disability pension. Browning differed from Payne because in Browning the pension could not be
affected by recovery against the torifeasor, while in Payne the
pension was reduced by such recovery. As Denning saw it, the
plaintiff in Browning could not have received the disability pension and his salary if he had remained in service. Since he was
seeldng recovery for the loss of future earning opportunity, i.e.,
his pay if he had remained in service, the amount of the disability pension-which he would not have received had he been receiving pay-would have to be deducted from the award. By
adopting the rationale of Singletons opinion in Payne, he was
able to rid himself of that troublesome precedent. 33 Diplock,
L.J., agreed with Denning, saying that the matter was one of
simple arithmetic: the plaintiff recovers the difference between
what he would have received had he not been injured and what
he will receive following the injury. If he had not been injured,
he would have received his salary for the period in which he
remained in service; since he was injured and forced to retire,
he receives a disability pension rather than the salary. He,
therefore, would be entitled to recover from the tortfeasor the
difference between the salary and disability pension he will
receive now that he is retired (to be strictly accurate, he recovers
the difference between the amount he would have earned, considering possible salary increases, less what he may be expected
to earn despite his disability, if anything, and less the disability
pension-which is not a matter of simple arithmetic). Donovan,
L.f., dissented, saying that the case was indistinguishable from
Payne and that the rationale of Payne, as he saw it, was not
affected by Singleton's "additional reason." He also brought
in the collateral source doctrine, pointing out that money payable from a collateral source is not "compensation" for the tort.
13 3 He concluded that it was open to the court to accept that ground as
having binding effect and to discard the other. [19631 1 Q.B. at 760,
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And, like Singleton in Payne, he discussed the relationship between pension rights and serviceman's pay.
Denning, then, saw the following categories of benefits and
their effect on tort recovery:
(1) proceeds of insurance policies for which the plaintiff
had given value-no deduction;
(2) true gratuities-no deduction;
(3) sums of money which the plaintiff is under an obligation
or has undertaken to repay-no deduction;
(4) sums which the plaintiff receives as of right such as
continuation of wages during disability under sick leave
or "half-pay" arrangements,' 34 and disability pensions
that would not be reduced because of tort recoverydeduction.
He was also unwilling to rest the decision on the analogies
either to insurance, which would argue against a deduction, or
sick leave, which would argue in favor of a deduction. 35 The
test was whether the plaintiff was being compensated twice for
the same loss: since he would not have received both the disability pension and his salary had he stayed in the service, the
disability pension had to be deducted from the award for loss
of future earning opportunity.
Now let us consider the problem under the functional approach. Rejecting the collateral source rule, as we do, and
certainly rejecting distinctions depending on whether the accident was the causa causans of the benefit, is Lord Denning's
reasoning persuasive? I think not. Of course, the plaintiff would
not have received both his salary and the disability pension.
But another question remains to be answered: why he did
receive the pension? Probably the answer is that our societal
values demand that a person injured "in the line of duty" receive a government pension. We are thinking of the person
wounded in battle or the like, but one injured in an automobile
134 In Browning the plaintiff did not seek to recover the value of his wages
paid during the period of disability. As the subsequent discussion will indicate,
the rationale under which we justify the recovery of loss of future earning opportunity without regard to the disability pension would also justify recovery for
the value of his lost time during the period of disability notwithstanding that his
salary was continued.
135 [1963] 1 Q.B. at 760-61.
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accident "in the line of duty" is also included in the statute.
This reason does not help our analysis. We are looking for a
reason translatable into economic terms affecting the question
of cumulative recovery.
Suppose a young man contemplating a military career consuits the recruiting officer and is told, among other things, that
he can retire at half-pay after twenty years, and that if he is
ever forced to retire because of disability incurred in the line of
duty, he will receive a generous pension. He is told of all the
other "fringe benefits." There is no doubt that the availability
of these benefits cushions his shock when he is told of the low
salary. The assumption may then be made that a serviceman
or other public servant exposed to hazardous duty receives the
guarantee of a disability pension 36 as part of his total compensation picture, and that if it were not for the possibility of a pension
and other fringe benefits, he would receive a higher salary. In
Payne, Singleton observed that the fact that a person in the Navy
receives a pension is a factor which enters into the question of
pay, and in the absence of pension rights, "it is reasonable to
assume that the pay would be higher."1 37 In Browning, Donovan,

dissenting, stressed that the plaintiff "earned" his pension by
taking less salary, and drew an analogy to insurance premiums:
the difference between the salary as it was with the pension
rights included and what it would have been if there were no
pension rights was the equivalent of the payment of premiums
of insurance.18
The insurance analogy may appear more clearly in a case
where the employee has actually made a contribution to a fund
from which the disability pension is paid. Such a case was Judd
v. Hammersmith, Etc. Hospitals Board,139 decided by Queen's
Bench. The plaintiff was employed by a municipal council and
was required to make contributions from his salary to a pension
fund, which were matched by the employer. He was permanently
disabled as a result of an accident and forced to retire on a
136 Whereas in the case of private employment, disability pensions are
generally absent. The disabled employee may receive 'Workmen's Compensation
benefits, which ar roperly considered social insurance, and which, therefore,
do not form a part of his total compensation picture.
137 Pavne v. Railway Executive, [1952] 1 K.B. 26, 40 (C.A. 1951).
138 [19631 1 Q.B. at 763-64.
139 [1960] 1 Weekly L.R. 328 (Q.B.).
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pension, seven years before retirement age. In his suit the defendant admitted that there should not be a deduction for the
value of the pension represented by the plaintiff's contribution,
but argued that that portion representing the employer's contribution should be deducted. The court rejected the contention, although the decision in Browning would indicate that in
the future a court would have to do this very thing. The court
found no distinction between that portion represented by the
employee's and employer's contribution because:
As everybody knows, in a contributory pension scheme,
whilst the employee makes a contribution and the employerin this case the council-makes one, the amount which the
employer contributes has to come from somewhere, and when
there is a scheme of this sort in operation, it would seem, as
a matter of common sense, that wages or the salary paid
would have to take into account and reflect the contributions
made by the employer, at all events in some degree; it is not
just a case of the employee paying so much and the employer
paying so much, because it is almost bound to be that the
actual wages, or salary, paid would be very likely less than
the notional sum which the employee might get if there were
no such scheme in operation.140
The court, however, did not base its decision on this ground,
but on the authority of Payne.
The reasoning that the employee receives less salary because
of a pension finds its way into American cases contrary to
Browning, although the decision rationale is usually the collateral source rule. In Hume v. Lacey,'14 which involved the
same factual situation, a California appellate court held that
the disability pension would not affect the recovery of damages.
Although basing its decision on the collateral source rule, it went
on to say:
It may be observed that there is a valid reason for not giving
the wrongdoer any benefit from pension rights with which he
had nothing to do. They were previously acquired by the
injured party, were paid for by him in some manner, and the
at 330.
112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952).

140 Id.
141
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fact that he had other property in the nature of a pension
142
right may logically be held immaterial. (Emphasis added.)
In Beaulieu v. Elliot, 43 which involved both a disability pension
and wages that were continued from the time of injury to the
time of discharge, it was observed:
By entering the military service, Elliot in effect agreed to
perform certain duties and functions in exchange for certain
benefits to be given him by the government. One of those
benefits was that he was to receive military pay and allowances during periods of physical incapacity from performing
his duties. This was in the nature of a contractual agreement
between Elliot and the government when he became a member of the armed forces, and which he may have paid for
by accepting wages lower than those he might have obtained
from the performance of like duties in civilian life. (Emphasis
added.)144
In the case of a contributory scheme by police and firemen, one
court drew the analogy to a system of "forced insurance" and
held that the receipt of the disability pension would not affect
tort recovery1 45 The fact that the plaintiff "gave value" for the
disability pension by taking less salary was completely ignored
by the court's majority in Browning.
Let us examine the matter of "giving value" more carefully.
Ignoring employee contributions-which we may liken to insurance premiums-let us assume that the entire cost of the
pension is borne by the employer. In Judd v. Hammersmith the
court supposed a fixed sum to be available for payment to the
employee as part of a "package. 1 46 Suppose that this sum is
$5,000 and that $500 per year is allocated to "pension and disability." The employee starts to work at age 30, and we will
assume (because our mathematics is weak) that he would re42

Id. at 151, 245 P.2d at 675-76.

143 434 P.2d 665 (Alas. 1967).

'44 434 P.2d at 673-74. See also Young v. Warr,
S.C.
, 165 S.E.2d 797
(1969).
145Rusk v. Jeffries, 110 N.J.L. 307, 164 A. 313 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
See also Capital Products v. Romer, 252 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
146 That this is realistic is demonstrated by the "package" concept found in
collective bargaining agreements.
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ceive the same salary until he retired at age 65. At that time,
or whenever he is permanently and totally disabled, he will
receive a pension of $100 per month. He has been advised of
this at the beginning of his employment. He thus receives a
salary of $4,500 per year, and at the end of twenty years it can
be said that his pension rights have "cost" him $10,000 in gross
salary (to determine actual cost, we would have to deduct
income taxes and decide whether he would have spent the
extra money or kept it, in which case we would have to add
interest). As a result of an automobile accident, he is permanently and totally disabled at age 50. In a suit against the
tortfeasor, he recovers his salary of $4,500 for the fifteen years
until retirement (it is reduced to present worth, of course, but
4
we will deal only with gross figures), which amounts to $67,500.1 7
He will be receiving a disability pension in lieu of salary for
those fifteen years, which comes to $18,000. The court in Browning held that this sum would have to be deducted from his
recovery, so if we deducted this amount, that would leave an
award of $49,500. In order to secure this pension of $18,000,
he had to actually relinquish some $10,000 in salary. His gain
from the disability pension, therefore, is $8,000 rather than
$18,000.
The plaintiff would have had to take less salary even if he
had not been injured. 4 But it is the defendant asserting that the
pension should operate to reduce recovery and prevent overcompensation. He is not overcompensated if the award is reduced by his "net gain," that is, the difference between the
amount of the disability pension and the amount of reduced
salary. Since it is the defendant who is seeking the deduction,
the plaintiff's salary reduction, even if he did not receive the
benefit, is irrelevant. It is equally correct to observe that if the
accident had never happened, the plaintiff would not have needed
the pension. If we are going to look at the total economic
picture in order to determine the plaintiff's actual loss, we must
consider (1) lost salary, (2) benefits accruing because of the
injury, and (3) what the plaintiff gave up in order to obtain
147 We are also, for purposes of this example, assuming that income tax
savings48 will not be considered.
' Ganz, supra note 121, at 565.
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those benefits. The award should equal the difference between
(1) and the excess of (2) over (3). If this is done, the plaintiff
is put in the same position as he would have been if there had
never been an accident and he had not received the pension.
In Browning the court considered factors (1) and (2), awarding
the plaintiff the difference between (1) and (2), but completely
ignored factor (3).
This may be because the example I posed did not correspond
to the state of facts presented in Browning and probably represents an impossible factual situation. The problem is how to
assign a specific sum of money as the pension "cost:' and even
more importantly, how to assign a sum of money as the cost
of the disability portion. We are familiar with the "packages"
in collective bargaining plans: so much for wages, so much for
sick leave benefits, so much for retirement, and so on. Even
then, it may be asked how effectively we can allocate the value
of a disability pension paid only in case of contingency. When
applied to military personnel, the matter is much more complex.
The pay structure may be such that the value of all fringe benefits exceeds the value of the salary. The theory of military service
is that the serviceman-historically without dependents-has all
his needs supplied and his salary only represents "pocket money".
The theory remains the same, but now military men have dependents and American affluence has forced military salaries upward. Where there are dependents, extra allowances are provided, and the dependents are eligible for fringe benefits. The
serviceman's salary is planned to reflect early retirement at halfpay, free medical care for himself and his dependents, quarters
allowances or free housing, and post exchange privileges. Indeed,
if we wanted to be completely scientific, the military plaintiff
who is forced to retire should also recover the value of the fringe
benefits lost while he is recovering for loss of future earnings.
It is accurate to assume that if the military pay structure were
organized on the same basis as private industry or even other
public employment, salaries would be substantially higher. Perhaps we could determine with a small computer how much higher
salaries would be if there were no fringe benefits. 149 It would,
149But query, since military pay scales and benefits are determined by
Congress, can the question be approached in purely economic terms?
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however, take a most sensitive computer to assign a specific
value to the disability pension.
It may be contended that the pension's value and cost in
terms of reduced pay is very little. On the other hand, the total
value of the fringe benefits is very significant. The serviceman
accepts less pay because of the security embodied in fringe benefits, one aspect of which is a disability pension in case of injury.
If we had a very good computer, we might be able to answer
questions such as these:
(1) What would be the difference in pay if the military did
not offer fringe benefits?
(2) What portion of this difference can be assigned to the
disability pension?
(3) What is the economic value of the fringe benefits lost
during the years of the plaintiff's premature retirement?
If this information were available, it would be possible to determine how much the plaintiff "gained" through the pension,
so as to offset this amount against his recovery for loss of salary
caused by his retirement.
We may now leave the world of computers and return to
the system used for determining personal injury damages. This
system does not have computers, but instead twelve laymen or
a judge, who can assimilate only so much data. Nor is recovery
based on the economic needs of the injured person and his
family. If it were, the fact that he was receiving a pension, regardless of what he "paid" for it, would be relevant to determine
actual need. 5 ° If the injured person can establish a case of
liability against the particular defendant under our rules of tort
law, we allow him to recover for all economic loss sustained. We
measure this economic loss with reference to the income he
could have earned, but will not because of his disability resulting
from the accident. If this amount is to be reduced by pension
benefits, it is not because they demonstrate the absence of needfor this is not the basis of compensation-but because they indicate how much was actually lost. This question cannot be
15o "A system of compensation designed to limit awards to strict economic
loss and to guarantee such recovery may someday evolve. Certainly, most of the
problems to which the collateral source rule provides a rough solution can be
eliminated in such a context." Maxwell, supra note 97, at 695.
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accurately or even roughly determined unless the cost of the
benefit to him, i.e., the reduced salary he took because of the
availability of the benefit, is also considered. And we have no
way, in the absence of a very special computer, which we don't
have, of determining this amount The necessary data to feed
into the system is simply not available, even if the system could
absorb it. It should be noted that to the extent the plaintiff was
employed for a lengthy period he will be receiving the disability
pension for a relatively shorter period of time. Consequently,
it is not at all inconceivable (except perhaps in the military
situation, where there are so many fringe benefits) that the
amount of reduced salary would exceed the value of the benefit.
Therefore, the result reached under the collateral source rule
and the functional approach coincide. The court in Browning
is wrong when it gives the defendant credit without deducting
the cost to the plaintiff. It assumed that the lost salary less the
pension represented the plaintiff's true economic loss without
considering what the plaintiff relinquished in order to get that
pension. The pension may represent the equivalent compensation that he would have received earlier if it had not been for
the pension arrangment. Since we cannot realistically determine
the value of what the plaintiff forfeited to get the pension, we
cannot assign value to the pension. Under our law we give the
plaintiff what he "lost" rather than what he "needs", so there is
no justification for deducting the pension on the ground that it
reduces the plaintiff's need for compensation. The defendant is
claiming reduced liability, and it seems proper that he substantiate his claim. If he cannot show the plaintiff's actual benefit, which he cannot, since he is unable to show how much the
plaintiff gave up in order to obtain the benefit, he should not be
able to claim the saving. Even though the defendant may not
be a moral wrongdoer, he is, by law, assigned responsibility for
the plaintiffs loss. The plaintiff prima facie demonstrates loss
by showing the salary he would have received if he had not been
disabled. The defendant contends that the loss is actually less,
because the plaintiff will receive a pension. This is true, in economic terms, only if the value of the pension exceeds the value of
what the plaintiff gave up to get it. This the defendant cannot
show in the context of our system of awarding damages for per-
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sonal injuries. He does not have the data, and there is a serious
question as to whether the system could absorb such data if it
existed. For this reason, recovery for loss of future earning
opportunity should not be reduced by the receipt of a disability
pension.
IfI. The Insured Accident Victim
Insurance cases have posed no difficulty for the courts, and
the defendant's claim that insurance benefits should operate to
reduce recovery has constantly been rejected. 151 This is clearly
established with life insurance proceeds in a wrongful death
action, since the proceeds would have been payable at some time
and the only effect of the fatal accident was to accelerate pay-

ment.1 52 In the case of damage to property, no problem of "over-

compensation" arises, because the property insurer subrogates
to the plaintiff's claim against the tortfeasor 53 However, in
personal injury cases a question as to the effect of insurance may
properly arise. Subrogation does not generally exist with respect
to health, accident and related insurance, 154 unless perhaps it is
specifically provided for in the contract. 55 Therefore, the accident victim who has taken out "first person" insurance against
various aspects of personal injury damage retains the insurance
proceeds notwithstanding recovery against the tortfeasor. The
question is whether his recovery should be affected by the insurance proceeds. The courts, applying the collateral source
rule, have held not.'5
It is important to consider present societal attitudes toward
insurance. At first insurance was considered an aleatory transaction 57 in which the insured "gambled" a small premium against
the possibility of substantial recovery if a designated contingency
151 See Maxwell, supra note 97, at 673 n. 14.
52
1 See West, supra note 80, at 409 n. 106. This question was involved in

one of the earliest American cases on the subject of collateral source benefits.
Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1860).
153 See W. VANCE, INsuRANcE § 134 (3rd ed. 1951).
.54Id. See Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d
638 (1954).

-55 Subrogation on this basis was allowed in Michigan Hospital Service v.

Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954). The Blue Cross policy did not
provide
for subrogation, but the Blue Shield policy did.
156 See the discussion and citation of cases in Maxwell, supra note 97, at 674;
West 5 7supra note 80, at 409 n. 108.
1
See Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1870).
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occurred. This was rationalized on the ground that the insured
was insuring against a "catastrophe", such as his death, the
destruction of his home or farm, the loss of goods at sea. 15 While
the gambling aspect is never far from our minds, as the law
regarding insurable interest and the suicide provisions of a life
insurance policy indicate, taking out insurance has become very
respectable. The "good family man" will take out insurance to
protect his family. First, of course, is the need for adequate life
insurance, enough to provide for his family's needs when he is
gone. If he earns $10,000 per year, and his family needs, let
us say, $8,000 per year when he dies, he will need to carry
$200,000 worth of insurance. His wife might die before the
children grow up and there will be the expenses of a housekeeper.
Some insurance on the wife is also desirable. And it is a good
idea to take out a small policy on each child to cover burial
expenses in case of death. Since college is expensive, the prudent
father who wants to provide an education for his children will
also take out an endowment policy. As to health, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield represent the minimum protection, with major medical becoming an essential. The traditional fire insurance policy
has been replaced by a comprehensive homeowner's policy which
costs little more. As a motorist, he will take out the minimum
10/20 coverage, but if he is at all prudent, he will make it
50/100, and since 100/800 costs practically no more, he is advised to insure for the highest amount. This will be part of a
comprehensive family automobile policy.
Thus far, we have been talking only about "basic protection",
but it is clear that the concept of insurance against catastrophe
has changed even here. Blue Cross and Blue Shield meet most
expenses of an ordinary hospitalization, and major medical protects against the really serious illness. Gone are the days when
the family "saved" to meet medical crises. The modem homeowner's policy protects against all kinds of small losses that in
the past any homeowner assumed he would have to bear. The
comprehensive automobile policy guarantees that the automobile
owner, if he wishes, can have all the expenses of an accident met,
save for a $50 deductible provision. More significantly, the con158

See the discussion in W. VAwcE, supra note 153, §11.
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cept of insurance as protection against loss has changed. Now
it is possible to insure against the occurrence of a contingency,
and notwithstanding the gambling aspect of this arrangement, it
is perfectly respectable. Modern insurance marketing stresses
that the insured can cumulate insurance proceeds. Furthermore,
benefits are payable without regard to "out-of-pocket" loss or
obligation. Consider an individual who anticipates that he may
have to go into the hospital at some time. Moreover, let us say
he is a hypochondriac. He will take out Blue Cross, Blue Shield
and major medical to cover the actual costs. But he may take
out any number of health and accident policies in addition.
One may pay him a specified sum of money whenever he undergoes an operation, which he may use as he wishes (query, is this
insurance against pain and suffering?). Another may pay him
so much per day while he is in the hospital. This may be akin
to income protection insurance (although income protection insurance is actually marketed differently), but there is no requirement that the purchaser of the insurance has been earning
any income. If a person is insured to this extent, is he not insuring against a contingency, with an element of gambling surrounding the transaction? It may be asked whether insurance
is not marketed so as to encourage such gambling. It is necessary
to recognize the changed societal attitude toward insurance and
to distinguish between insurance against loss and insurance
against the occurrence of a contingency. The prevalence of first
person insurance indicates that many accident victims will have
received insurance benefits which have met some of the loss
for which they are trying to recover against the tortfeasor. 5 9 The
question remains as to whether the receipt of such benefits should
affect their tort recovery.
The courts have refused to allow the receipt of insurance
benefits to affect tort recovery, stressing that the plaintiff has
paid for the insurance benefits and is recovering them under
his contract with the insurer. With disarming candor the Vermont court, in the earlier days of insurance, stated that an accident insurance policy was "in the nature of a wager between
159 As to how well such insurance and other collateral benefits meet actual
loss, see Morris and Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 913, 920-22 (1962).
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the plaintiff and a third person, the insurer, to which the defendant was in no measure privy."' 60 The court went on to make
two other points. First, recovery should not be reduced because
the plaintiff did not acquire the policy in order to benefit the
defendant. Secondly, there might be subrogation as between the
plaintiff and the insurer, but subrogation would not affect the
plaintiff's recovery against the defendant. Around the same time
an English case utilized a somewhat different rationale. 1 1 It
stressed that the right to be compensated when the event insured
against occurred was the equivalent of the premiums paid (presumably that part of the premium apportioned to protection).
The court also resorted to the causa causans doctrine: the insurance contract rather than the accident was the causa causans
of the receipt of benefits, so the benefits could not be deducted
from the award of compensation for the accident. The view
that the plaintiff has paid for the benefits is followed by American courts which hold that the plaintiff can recover for hospital
and medical expenses, notwithstanding that they were covered
in whole or in part by Blue Cross and Blue Shield 62 or health
insurance. 63

The argument that the plaintiff has paid for the benefits
received is also advanced by the proponents of the collateral
source rule. The benefits, "being products of the plaintiffs own
thrift, foresight and sacrifice, should be immune from mitigation."164 It is further contended that to allow the plaintiff to
recover both the insurance proceeds and full damages may serve
as an inducement to insure.'65 Moreover, as a practical matter,
the beneficiary of an accident policy is usually willing to settle
his claim for less, so to allow him to keep the proceeds may
66
facilitate the chances of settlement.
160 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 537 (1870).
161 Bradbua v. Great Western Railway Co., [1874] L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (C.A.).
162 See e.g., Taylor v. Jennison, 355 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1960); Kirkham v.
Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1960).
C.f. Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d
53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959), holding that insured who bad received Blue Cross
benefits could also recover under the medical payments clause of an insurance
policy.
163 See e.g., West v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286 154 So.2d 297 (1963); Healy v.
Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961).
364 See Lambert, The Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 531,
544. See
65 also Jolowicz, 1963 C mB. L.J. 37, 40 (1963).
Lambert, supranote 164, at 544.
166
See discussion in James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem
of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 555-56 (1952).
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The reply to this argument is that by purchasing accident
insurance the plaintiff is seeking security rather than possible
double recovery. 167 He may be injured in circumstances where
no tort recovery is possible, e.g., a one-car accident, or may be
unable to make out a case of liability. Even when there is a
possibility of tort recovery, he wants to see that his bills are
paid without the need for litigation. Certainly the insured is
thinking primarily in terms of payment of the bills, whether as
a result of the accident or any other occasion for hospitalization.
It is doubtful if double recovery will have much to do with an
68
individual's decision to take out health or accident insurance.
At least this is so in the case of what I call "loss insurance" as
opposed to contingency insurance.
The argument is also made that where there is insurance, the
plaintiff should recover less, because he has lost less. 69 In the
case of loss insurance, this is correct. If his hospital and medical
bills came to $1,000, $970 of which was paid by Blue Cross, the
plaintiff's out of pocket loss for hospital and medical expenses
was only $30. The question is what to do about the remaining
$970. This is posed in terms of the dilemma between overcompensation and windfall.
One proposal is that the principle of subrogation be extended
to health, accident and other forms of loss insurance, as now
applied to fire and marine insurance. In our example, the plaintiffs casualty insurer would recover $970 from the defendant,
or more realistically, from his liability insurer, either in a direct
action, or from the proceeds of the plaintiff's recovery. Subrogation is often proposed as the.perfect solution to overcompensation
and windfall, since the defendant will be required to pay full
167 Swarz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U. L. REV. 348, 354 (1961);

James, supra note 166, at 553. See also the discussion in Ganz, Mitigation of
Damages by Benefits Received, 25 MoD. L. RIv. 559, 565 (1962). And even if
this were not his purpose it is contended that it is undesirable to permit the
insured to wager, to "gamble a very small portion of his premium on the chance
of a windfall in excess of recovery." James, supra note 166, at 544-45.

1-68 "The plaintiff recovers but once for the wrong done him, and he receives
the insurance money upon a contract to which the defendant is in no way privy,
and in respect to which his own wrongful act can give him no equities." Perrott
v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 47, 56 (1868).
See also Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1860); Ganz, Mitigation of Damages
by Benefits
Received, 25 MOD. L. REv. 559 (1962).
169

See Ganz, supra note 167, at 565.
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damages, but the plaintiff will not receive double recovery.170
Moreover, subrogation might operate to reduce the rates for loss
171

insurance.

I must confess that I find this solution somewhat incredible.
For what is proposed is something no less than the alteration
of the health and accident insurance business. Subrogation
has been allowed where there is an express provision to this
effect in the policy,17 but the fact remains that most health
173
and accident insurance policies do not have such provisions.
Since the courts traditionally allowed subrogation in property
claims, the fire and marine insurance business was organized
on this basis, and rates reflect the pattern of subrogation. Moreover, it may be that in a significant number of property insurance
claims there was a question of tort liability, so that to allow
subrogation could materially affect the rates for fire and marine
insurance, i.e., a substantial portion of the loss would be shifted
from the casualty insurer to the responsible enterprise or liability
insurer. But it may be asked whether the number of Blue Cross
and Blue Shield claims, for example, in which there might be
tort recovery is sufficient so as to affect the rate structure. At
least this is doubtful. If health and accident companies wanted
subrogation, they would provide for it in the policies. 4 Indeed,
automobile liability insurance companies do not seem impressed
by the "savings" resulting from subrogation to property damage
claims, as evidenced by the widespread "knock for knock" arrangements. As Professor James has said about subrogation,
"Altogether it is a far, far thing from the fair-haired boy it is
often assumed to be."175 In theory, insurance companies are in

business to insure against loss and to pay such losses when they
170 West, supra note 80, at 414; Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
CollateralSource Rule, 77 HAlv.L. REv. 741, 751 (1964); Note, The Mitigating
Effect on Damages of Social Welfare Programs, 63 HAv.L. REv. 330, 332-33
(1949).
171 This is assumed to follow from the allowance of subrogation. Query, will
this necessarily be so, or will the "savings" be disposed of otherwise?
172 Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713

(1954).

173
.Tames, supra note 166, at 553 n. 60.
' 74 We may assume that this would be permitted under state insurance laws,or if such subrogation were desired, the companies would try to obtain favorable
legislation.
175 James, supra note 166, at 563.
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occur.' 6 When the loss has been met by the health and accident insurer, it may be asked whether there is any utility in
shifting it again from this efficient distributor to an enterprise
or liability insurer, which will then have to distribute it among
its consumers, if it can,' 7 7 or among its policyholders.
In any event, if subrogation is to be introduced into the
health and accident insurance field, it would seem that there
should be a more economically rational justification than that
it is necessary to prevent double recovery or to avoid giving the
defendant a windfall. The decision to alter the nature of insurance practice should be based upon a consideration of
empirical data, rate structures and the like, which would not
ordinarily be available in a suit for personal injuries. This
requires a legislative judgment made after careful investigation.
For a court to hold that the plaintiff could not recover for loss
met by insurance, but that the insurer could recover as subrogee,
would be to judicially impose subrogation in a new field, and
I do not believe that a court should or would do so.
Discarding the subrogation solution, we still have to decide
what to do about the $970. Professor James suggests that since
the courts were unwilling to let the accident insurer subrogate
to the rights of the insurer, 1 78 they approached the problem in
terms of the overcompensation-windfall dilemma, and resolved
the dilemma in favor of the plaintiff. 7 9 It cannot be argued that
if the plaintiff's hospital bills are paid by the health and accident insurer and he also recovers their cost from the defendant,
he is recovering twice for an ascertained loss. But, as the advocates of the collateral source rule maintain, the plaintiff has
"purchased" one recovery by paying the premiums for the insurance. Granted that this is so, what conclusion follows?
It is not the "wisdom of Solomon" to suggest that the functionally sound solution is what the court in our early Vermont
176 In practice, however, it seems that much of the automobile liability insurance business is based on restrictive underwriting. The insurance companies
try to identify the "good risks". This being so, the insurance companies are then
in business to collect premiums and to insure against loss only those who are not
likely to incur it.
177 For the view that it cannot always do so, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distributionin the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 521-24 (1961).
178 Tames, supra note 166, at 555-56.
379 Id.
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case 8 0 was unwilling to say, namely, that the plaintiff purchased
the insurance for the benefit of the defendant. This was not
his intention, of course, but the insurance is available to meet
a loss that the defendant would otherwise have had to meet
under principles of tort liability. Since that loss was met by
insurance, the plaintiff has no need to recover it from the defendant. But since the plaintiff's insurance has rebounded to
the benefit of the defendant by relieving him of a portion of
his liability, it seems only fair that the defendant pay for the
insurance protection. An analogy may be drawn to the case of
8'
Automobile Insurance Company v. Model Family Laundries.1
Goods in storage were destroyed by fire, and the bailor refused
to pay anything for the storage. In a suit by the bailee, recovery
was denied because he had breached the contract by failing to
return the goods, notwithstanding that he was not responsible
for their destruction. He could not recover the reasonable value
of his services in storing the goods on a restitutionary theory,
because the services were of no value to the bailor when the
goods were not returned. However, the bailee did insure the
goods, as he was required to do under the contract, and the
insurer settled with the bailor. Therefore, the bailee's act of
insuring had rebounded to the benefit of the bailor, and on a
restitutionary theory, the bailee was entitled to recover the cost
of insurance.
In that case the bailee was required to insure the goods
under the contract, so he intended to insure for the benefit of
the bailor. Nonetheless, the result should be no different where
the insurance has benefited the other party. There is no need
for the plaintiff to recover the cost of medical services which
were met by insurance. But if he is not reimbursed for the cost
of the insurance, the insurance did not benefit him, since he
could have recovered the loss met by insurance from the defendant as tort damages. It would be unfair to make him, in
effect, pay for the insurance which operated to reduce his
tort recovery. Since the insurance enabled the defendant to avoid
a portion of his liability, he should reimburse the plaintiff for
180 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1870).
181 133 Conn. 433, 52 A.2d 137 (1947).
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the cost of the insurance under a restitutionary theory. To this
extent, the plaintiff is not overcompensated, and the defendant
does not receive a windfall.
If this approach is followed, the question then becomes what
are the premiums for which the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed. If the insurance policy was in force for ten years
at the time of the accident, the defendant would argue that he
should be liable only for a portion of the premium due the tenth
year, since the plaintiff also had protection against other possible
loss unrelated to the accident. 182 Or, he may contend that during the life of the policy the plaintiff made use of his hospital
protection on other occasions. Ultimately, he will argue, very
little of the premium cost can be attributed to the protection
afforded the plaintiff as a result of the accident.
At this point we must stop since we are necessarily limited
in the nature and amount of data that we can feed into the
machine. The spectacle of the jury totaling the number of the
plaintiff's illnesses plus the amount of insurance premiums in
an attempt to assign a certain portion to the particular accident
is ludicrous. Either the medical expenses were so extensive as
to exceed the total amount of premiums paid during the life of
the policy, in which case the defendant should be very relieved
that the plaintiff carried insurance, or they were relatively small,
so as to be less than the total of the premium paid. Moreover,
if the plaintiff had insurance for nine years and finally made
use of it in the tenth, it would seem that he measures the cost
of the premiums for the entire period against the benefits paid.
We would, therefore, limit our consideration to the total amount
of premiums paid during the life of the policy.
Where insurance meets an ascertained portion of the loss,
there is no reason, under our compensatory theory of damages,
to permit the plaintiff to recover again for that portion from
the defendant. The defendant, who is relieved of a liability
that under tort law he would be required to bear, cannot complain if he is made to pay for the insurance that rebounded to
his benefit. For practical reasons-again, we do not have a sensitive computer in the jury room-and taking account of society's
attitude toward insurance, this would mean the total premiums
182 See

Peckmnpaugh, supra note 82, at 553.
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paid during the life of the policy. The plaintiff would recover
either the cost of the medical expenses that were met by insurance or the total premiums paid, whichever was smaller.
This could be determined at the pre-trial hearing, since we
may assume that the health and accident insurer would have
an accurate record of premiums paid and that the medical expenses would be ascertainable. The "damages" for medical
services could then be stipulated.
However, not all insurance is loss insurance. As we have
pointed out, it is possible for a person to "over-insure", that is,
to take out more insurance than is necessary to cover his losses.
Fire insurance policies are written so that the insured cannot
cumulate, and where the property owner has insured the property
in excess of its value, recovery under the policy is on a pro rata
basis.1 8 3 Perhaps a fear of arson for the purpose of collecting
insurance proceeds has impelled such an approach. But health
and accident insurance does not operate in this manner, and
indeed is marketed on the basis that the plaintiff can cumulate.
Perhaps it is undesirable to permit a person to insure against
the contingency of illness to the extent that he can recover a
specified sum for a stay in the hospital or for undergoing a
particular operation.8 4 This is not the concern of a court awarding personal injury damages, where the legislature has permitted
the health and accident insurers to carry on their business in
this way. Once the plaintiff's actual loss has been measured, insurance recovery beyond actual loss is truly collateral' 85 to the
tort case, and should not affect the damages award. Therefore,
insurance coverage is relevant only insofar as it meets the loss
which the defendant would otherwise be required to bear.
Moreover, even as to loss insurance, other considerations may
dictate that the plaintiff have full recovery of the insurance
proceeds and tort damages rather than be limited to the insurance
proceeds and the cost of the premiums. We will discuss this
in connection with recovery for loss of earning opportunity. It
will be contended that there are sound reasons to ignore the
183 W. VANCE, supra note 153, § 154.

184We do not seem to have considered the economic utility of "overinsuring".
185
He would recover from the tortfeasor for his actual loss and from the
insurer under the contract, which, by definition, has nothing to do with the loss.
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plaintiff's income protection insurance, for example, just as there
are sound reasons for ignoring the receipt of social insurance
benefits in such a case. The point we are trying to make now,
however, is that where an identifiable loss has been met by
insurance, and there are not countervailing considerations, the
plaintiff need not be compensated for that loss by the defendant.
Since the insurance has operated to reduce the liability of the
defendant, the defendant rather than the plaintiff should bear
its cost.

